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Abstract
Wireless communications is part of everyday life. As it is incorporated into new products
and services, it brings additional security risks and requirements. A thorough understanding of
wireless protocols is necessary for network administrators and manufacturers. Though most wireless
protocols have strict standards, many parts of the hardware implementation may deviate from the
standard and be proprietary. In these situations reverse engineering must be conducted to fully
understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of the communication medium.
New 4G broadband wireless access protocols, including IEEE 802.16e and WiMAX, oer
higher data rates and wider coverage than earlier 3G technologies. Many security vulnerabilities,
including various Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, have been discovered in 3G protocols and the orig-
inal IEEE 802.16 standard. Many of these vulnerabilities and new security aws exist in the revised
standard IEEE 802.16e. Most of the vulnerabilities already discovered allow for DoS attacks to be
carried out on WiMAX networks. This study examines and analyzes a new DoS attack on IEEE
802.16e standard. We investigate how system parameters for the WiMAX Bandwidth Contention
Resolution (BCR) process aect network vulnerability to DoS attacks. As this investigation devel-
oped and transitioned into analyzing hardware implementations, reverse engineering was needed to
locate and modify the BCR system parameters.
Controlling the BCR system parameters in hardware is not a normal task. The protocol
allows only the BS to set the system parameters. The BS gives one setting of the BCR system
parameters to all WiMAX clients on the network and everyone is suppose to follow these settings.
Our study looks at what happens if a set of users, attackers, do not follow the BS's settings and
set their BCR system parameters independently. We hypothesize and analyze dierent techniques
to do this in hardware with the goal being to replicate previous software simulations that looked at
this behavior.
ii
This document details our approaches to reverse engineer IEEE 802.16e and WiMAX. Ad-
ditionally, we look at network security analysis and how to design experiments to reduce time and
cost. Factorial experiment design and ANOVA analysis is the solution. In using these approaches,
one can test multiple factors in parallel, producing robust, repeatable and statistically signicant
results. By treating all other parameters as noise when testing rst order eects, second and third
order eects can be analyzed with less signicance. The details of this type of experimental design
is given along with NS-2 simulations and hardware experiments that analyze the BCR system pa-
rameters. This purpose of this paper is to serve as guide for reverse engineering network protocols
and conducting network experiments.
As wireless communication and network security become ubiquitous, the methods and tech-
niques detailed in this study become increasingly important. This document can serve as a guide
to reduce time and eort when reverse engineering other communication protocols and conducting
network experiments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis documents our hardware investigation of the Bandwidth Contention Resolution
(BCR) system parameters and their eect on the average throughput of other client WiMAX nodes
when attackers maliciously set their own parameters. This includes documentation of reverse en-
gineering IEEE 802.16e and WiMAX on a Linux machine. The following chapters document the
steps we took. We hope that the details presented here can guide others doing similar wireless
and network protocol investigations. The work began as an eort to conduct hardware experiments
replicating the software work completed by Deng in [7] with hopes of verifying the results and/or
providing an analysis of the dierences between software simulations, specically NS-2, and actual
WiMAX hardware. The software simulations analyzed the ability of these parameters to be used
as a Denial of Service attack on WiMAX client nodes. Over time, as the project evolved, the focus
became a study of reverse engineering the hardware WiMAX protocol implementation.
Experimentation with hardware has proved challenging because a user is not supposed to
change the system parameters and therefore the protocol does not allow for it. The BS is the entity
that sets and controls the BCR system parameters. We have investigated various methods to modify
the system parameters in hardware and this paper describes the steps taken in hopes of aiding others
doing similar network research. Before presenting the details of these methods, an understanding of
the importance of wireless communication protocols and wireless security will help one comprehend
the motivation and signicance of this work. The remainder of this section summarizes wireless
communication, including its evolution to broadband wireless access and WiMAX, previous work
conducted in network and WiMAX DoS attacks, and IEEE 802.16 security vulnerabilities.
1
1.1 Wireless Communication and Security
The idea of wireless communications, rst formulated by Maxwell, was established at the end
of the nineteenth century [35]. Analog microwave radios have been in use for many decades providing
services such as television and mobile radios and, for the same amount of time, hobbyist have enjoyed
the communication provided by HAM radios. But two technologies made wireless communications
known by every household, cordless and cellular phones. Both of these were originally designed
for low-data rates and high latency tolerance for voice. Unlike cordless phones, cellular technology
needed to evolve to handle higher data rates and multiple uses. Cell phones, originally used only for
voice, became a resource to connect to the web and access data available there. The need for faster
and more reliable wireless protocols became apparent as users accessed increasing volumes of data,
especially video streaming, online. Network bandwidth had to increase to satisfy user demand.
Today wireless communication is ubiquitous, provided by cell phones, computers, game
consoles, and appliances. Bluetooth emerged as a leading protocol for short range, low data rate
personal communications. IEEE 802.11 and WiFi, Wireless Fidelity Alliance, is used for local area
networks with higher data rates that connect multiple devices within a building. Broadband wireless
access (BWA) protocols cover large areas, typically a 5 mile radius, providing high data rates. BWA
hird generation, 3G, technologies include GSM, UMTS, W-CDMA and are used currently in most
smart phone applications. WiMAX, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, and LTE,
long-term evolution, have emerged as competing 4G, fourth generation, technologies.
Wireless protocols operate on open channels since they are carried through air medium.
This implies that anyone having means to receive and/or transmit at a specic frequency has access
to the wireless channel. It is critical for security measures to be embedded into wireless protocols to
protect the trac condentiality and integrity and prevent attacks [35]. Each wireless protocol has
unique security issues. Though all are susceptible to man-in-the-middle and denial of service (DoS)
attacks. WiMAX uses the Media Access Control layer (MAC) to implement and handle security.
The MAC layer and security of WiMAX is discussed in following sections.
With the growing popularity of WiMAX and 4G technologies, our work originated from an
interest in the security related issues of the WiMAX protocol. Many vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.16e
had previously been investigated but there is little documentation about vulnerabilities in the system
parameters of the Bandwidth Contention Resolution (BCR) process, a process commonly used in
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WiMAX networks. A new question was proposed as to how these system parameters could be used
to carry out a DoS attack. Deng conducted work in [2] using the NS-2 simulator to investigate this
issue.
1.2 DoS and DDoS
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have
been used for a long time to block network resources. The large scale DDoS that caught the
publics attention was in February 2000 and included attacks on major websites such as Yahoo!,
Amazon, CNN.com, etc. The rst reported large-scale DDoS attack using the Internet occurred at
the University of Michigan in August 1999 and similar attacks had been targeting Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) networks for many years prior [14]. At this time there was already a myriad of dierent
DoS attacks that leverage weaknesses of common Internet protocols. Now with wireless networking
protocols, there are only more DoS attacks that can be used to cripple a network. Most DoS
and DDoS attacks comprise remote machines to use for attacks making it dicult to trace the
attacker [27]. Though it is challenging to determine who initiates attacks, it is fairly easy to manually
detect traditional DoS attacks using trac capturing and/or monitoring. Clever DoS attacks are
not only untraceable but are also arduous to detect.
A DoS attack is an attempt by a malicious user to prevent users of a service from being
able to use or access resources. Common DoS attacks goals include [27]:
 Flooding a network, thereby preventing legitimate network trac,
 Disrupting connections between two machines, thereby preventing access to a service,
 Preventing a specic individual from accessing a service,
 And disrupting service to a specic system or person.
DoS attacks can be broadly dividing into software and ooding attacks [21]. For wireless
networks a third type is jamming. Flooding overwhelms the network and/or specic machines
with trac making services and/or transmission unusable. Common ooding attacks include User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) ood, synchronization (SYN) ood, and smurf. In a UDP ood, return
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addresses of UDP packets are spoofed to connect one machines UDP character generator to another
machines UDP echo [14]. The SYN ood is for Transport Control Protocol (TCP) trac. It spoofs
the return addresses of SYN packets to a non-existing address and sends a number of these SYN
packets to the target machine. The target machines transmission queue will be full of synchronization
acknowledgment (SYN-ACK) packets destined for a machine that is not on the network and will
end up waiting for an acknowledge (ACK) response that will never come. Lastly, a smurf attack
leverages Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) by broadcasting ICMP ping requests with a
spoofed return address of the target machine [14].
Unlike ooding which requires multiple malformed packets, software DoS attacks typically
require only a few packets. Software attacks exploit bugs in the operating systems or applications.
Many of these vulnerabilities and attacks can be found my searching MITREs Common Vulnerability
and Exploit (CVE) database. Well known attacks include the ping of death and land attack [21]. In
the rst, the operating system crashes when a very large ICMP echo packet is received. The latter
attack sends a single SYN packet with spoofed addresses of the target machine for both the source
and destination elds corrupting the protocol stack.
Wireless networks are susceptible to ooding and software attacks. Additionally, each wire-
less protocol has unique communications that can be exploited for ooding and/or software DoS
attacks on that specic protocol. For example, in IEEE 802.11 an attacker can spoof the MAC
address in de-authentication and deassociation packets to disconnect target machines. In IEEE
802.16 range request message can be spoofed with the target machines MAC address requesting the
lowest quality downlink burst prole. One more DoS attack that can be carried out on wireless
networks is jamming. This technique transmits electromagnetic energy in frequency bands used by
the wireless equipment to interfere with the wireless communications. There are various types of
jammers including constant, deceptive, random, reactive, and intelligent [37].
Deng and Brooks investigated a new DDoS attack for WiMAX networks in [7] that manip-
ulates the Bandwidth Contention Resolution parameters. This type of attack would appear random
and would not result in sudden, drastic performance degradation making it hard to detect and dif-
ferentiate from network noise. This study is a hardware extension of the work in [7] and is still
investigating the possibility of using the parameters to carry out a DDoS attack. Next we will look
at the security vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.16e and WiMAX including DoS vulnerabilities.
4
1.3 Previous Work
Many security aws apparent in the original standard and additional security for support
of mobility has been addressed by the privacy sublayer of IEEE 802.16e. This includes enhanced
security, mobility management, and improved support for fast handovers. Issues still remain that
leave the protocol vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks hat can negatively aect network
availability. Known security vulnerabilities include unprotected network entry initially, unencrypted
management communications, no authentication on certain management frames, and sharing of
keying materials in multicast and broadcast messages [31]. Numerous papers present, analyze, and
simulate these vulnerabilities [1, 18, 26,31,43].
Naseer, Yoner, and Ahmed present an overview of security vulnerabilities found in IEEE
802.16e that can lead to DoS attacks in [31]. Some of the vulnerabilities stem from unprotected
management communications and messages, including the:
 Ranging request (RNG-REQ),
 Ranging response (RNG-RSP),
 Fast Power Control (FPC), and
 Reset Command (RES-CMD).
Ranging occurs when subscriber station (SS) begins to acquire timing oset and power
adjustment information from the BS to properly setup transmission. The RNG-REQ is the rst
message sent by the SS upon entering the network and is periodically sent afterwards to continue to
keep transmission in alignment. A SSs also can use this message to inform the BS of their preferred
downlink burst prole. RNG-REQ messages are neither encrypted nor veried, because they are
sent before a Security Associate (SA), which would allow for encrypted trac, is established. An
attacker could intercept this message and send one requesting the least eective downlink burst
prole.
Similarly, the RNG-RSP from the BS is not encrypted or authenticated. In this message
the BS can set the SS of transmission power, change the uplink and/or downlink channel, terminate
communications and re-initialization the MAC. A SS will accept any properly formatted RNG-RSP
and change according to the details of the message. A malicious user could send a decoy RNG-
RSP to set a SSs transmission power either very low [1] or high creating a water torture DoS attack
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both having negative consequence SS. Lastly, they could change the downlink and/or uplink channel
to dierent frequency range disturbing and breaking communications until the SS rescans to nd
correct frequency [31]. A DoS attack exploiting the RNG-RSP message is simulated using ns-2
network simulator in [1].
Other management messages of concern are the Fast Power Control (FPC), Mobile Neighbor
Advertisement (MOB NBRADV FPC), and Mobile Association Reply (MOB ASC-REP). The FPC
can be used similarly to the RNG-RSP message. Both the MOB NBRADV FPC and MOB ASC-
REP messages can be used maliciously in networks that support handovers. Additionally, the
authors in [31] introduce a new vulnerability related to Reset-Command (RES-CMD) message that
forces a SS to re-initialize its MAC state machine. The purpose of doing this would be to reset
a non-responsive or malfunctioning SS. Though this message is authenticated there are ways an
attacker can cause a RES-CMD to be sent, temporarily disconnecting a SS from the network, and
making it vulnerable to REG-REQ, REG-RSP attacks. An attacker that is part of network can
receive UL-MAPS and then transmit during the given slots of other SS causing the transmission to
be unintelligible. If they continue, the BS will assume that the victim is malfunctioning and will
issue RES-CMD [31].
As seen in [20], authentication request messages can be used for DoS attacks by sending
many request to the BS causing it to overload and become unable to serve other SS requests. Use
of long keys further increases the computational load for authorization verication. The BS will
not be able to defer between legitimate and illegitimate users till after processing the authentication
request. Scrambling attacks, jamming only specic WiMAX connections and not the entire frequency
spectrum, are another DoS attack that is a threat to all connection-based wireless protocols including
WiMAX [4]. This type of attack may go unnoticed if carried out appropriately and is analyzed in
[4] along with the solution of Dynamic CID Jumping Scheme (DCJS) proposed to defend against
such an attack. Additionally, research in [1] examines whether vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11 that
enable DoS attacks (replay attack, MAC address spoong, de-authentication, etc.) exist in the
IEEE 802.16 standard. This study concludes that WiMAX is more robust but previously mention
vulnerabilities unique to IEEE 802.16e still enable DoS.
Deng and Brooks proposed a novel DoS attack on WiMAX networks that manipulates the
Bandwidth Contention Resolution (BCR) parameters. BCR is a process used in the Best Eort
(BE) and Extended non-Real Time Polling Service (En-RTS) QoS classes to mitigate and handle
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transmission contentions. In [7], the attack is presented and analyzed using software simulations on
the NS-2 simulator. ANOVA analysis is applied to results to quantify the eect of the parameters
on average throughput and packet-loss. Our current work is an extension of this study, which will be
described further in Section 2.3.3. The original motivation was to analyze the possibility of using the
BCR system parameters to conduct a DoS and determine the system parameter settings that most
signicantly aect a WiMAX client's vulnerability to such an attack. Some conclusions about these
settings will be presented in Section 2.3.3 but due to diculties with hardware experimentation we
cannot make full conclusions to the best settings of the investigated system parameters.
Security is one clear reason for understanding the details of a communication protocol, but
there are other important reasons as well. Knowing when and where bottlenecks occur, where data
may be lost, and/or events that can cause network and/or resources to lock up can help eliminate
many potential issues early on. A deep understanding of a network protocol and how it interacts
with the hardware and equipment that use it provides great quality assurance. If you are to use a
specic manufacturers wireless equipment, knowing this information will allow you to assure your
own products and services. Unfortunately, many manufacturers make this information proprietary
and/or obfusicated, leaving one with only the option of reverse engineering to gain this level of
comprehension. Due to a lack of information about WiMAX's Bandwidth Contention Resolution
system parameters handling by the WiMAX devices used in our hardware testbeds, this study has
become a task of reverse engineering WiMAX hardware in search of these parameters.
1.4 Organization
The content of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter 1 describes the motivation behind
the work by exploring the history, issues and challenges of wireless communication and WiMAX.
Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 introduces information necessary to understand this study and the
methods analyzed for controlling the BCR system parameters in hardware. This includes details of
WiMAX and the IEEE 802.16e protocol, and most importantly a detailed explanation of the BCR
process of IEEE 802.16e. Additionally, an introduction to our previous NS-2 software simulations
is presented providing more insight to the hardware phase of research that is detailed in this docu-
ment. Lastly, an overview of the hardware resources and facilities used for our hardware WiMAX
experimentation is given.
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Chapter 3 presents a deeper analysis of the hardware testbeds used for WiMAX experimen-
tation. This analysis also looks at the eect of two BCR system parameters on SS's throughput.
Simulations were conducted in indoor and outdoor WiMAX environments. The results of these
experiments is presented and a comparison is made between the two testbeds and previous soft-
ware simulations. Following this chapter, the techniques investigated for modifying the BCR system
parameters are presented.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 outline our methods for conducting hardware experiments that
replicate the NS-2 simulations. They look at how one might be able to control the system parameters
separately from the BS. Many of the details and techniques used to reverse engineer WiMAX in
search of the BCR system parameters are presented. We hope that these details will guide others
carrying out WiMAX research and will provide a process for reverse engineering network protocols
in hardware.
Chapter 4 examines Intel's Centrino Advanced + Wireless 6250 device and the open source
drivers and software that are included with this device. Modications made to the code for our
study are presented here.
Chapter 5 looks at the Linux le system and memory. An abundant amount of information
about WiMAX is stored within the le system and the memory in Linux. Are techniques for delving
into and investigating this information in hopes of nding the BCR system parameters is presented.
Finally, Chapter 6 looks at the live WiMAX trac captures that were made in hardware
experimentation. This includes Ethernet trac carried via WiMAX and a WiMAX management
protocol that is used between the BS and ASN-GW. The later protocol is known as R6+ protocol
and is a NEC proprietary version of the R6 protocol. We searched for the system parameters within
the trac captured and by doing so learned more about how Linux interfaces with WiMAX and the
R6+ protocol. The purpose and results of the trac captures is presented in this Chapter.
Lastly, in Chapter 7, a summary of our techniques is given with conclusions about what
has been learned by this investigation. Other work that has been motivated by this study is briey
looked at as well, Section 7.2. Future work made possible by this study is presented last in Section
7.3.
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Chapter 2
Background
The IEEE 802.16e standard andWorldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX)
proles include a broad range of technical specications and procedures for handling various situa-
tions. The scope of the Background will be to present a brief overview of the IEEE 802.16e standard
and WiMAX, highlight specic details of the IEEE 802.16e standard that we have attempted to
leverage as a means to conduct our hardware experiments such as the MAC management messages
that carry the BCR system parameters. As an example of the breadth of the IEEE 802.16e pro-
tocol, many important topics such as handovers, power management, bandwidth conservation, and
adaptive antenna system will not be addressed throughout this study because they have no relation
to the BCR system parameters. The security aspects of the MAC layer are presented here despite
having no eect on the BCR process because it aids in understanding the previous WiMAX security
research presented in Chapter 1.
Following the MAC layer information, we discuss the details of the BCR process. Originally,
in [7] we propose that the BCR system parameters could be used to conduct a DoS attack on other
WiMAX client SSs by not playing fair and following the designated system parameter settings. To
understand why we hypothesized that these parameters could be used for a DoS attack, an in-depth
understanding of the BCR system process is required and presented. Lastly, the past software
simulations conducted in [7] is summarized and an overview is given of the hardware resource that
are used for this investigation. The work in [7] was the catalyst for the current hardware phase of
our study and a discussion of this work emphasizes our motivation for this study.
This chapter is structured as follows: we begin by covering the basic of the IEEE 802.16e
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standard and WiMAX including the physical characteristics, the dierences between the two, and
the service oriented focus of QoS. Following the overview, detailed discussion of the MAC layer is
given. Additional focus on the UCD, UL-MAP and TLV encoding is presented as subsections of the
MAC layer. Next, the previous software simulations are illustrated. The experimental design and
analysis used in both the previous software simulations and the hardware experiments, presented
in Chapter 3, are explained in the beginning of Section 2.3 followed by the actual simulations. To
conclude, the hardware resources used for this study are detailed. The GENI network and the
ORBIT facilitie,s including the software and hardware elements that compose the ORBIT testbeds,
are expounded.
2.1 WiMAX Overview
In broadband wireless access (BWA) there is a base station (BS) that controls access to a
network for multiple subscriber stations (SS). Bandwidth is granted to SS by the BS using allocation
schemes. Two-way communications is supported between SS and the BS. Communications are
separated into a downlink channel, data sent from base station to subscriber station, and an uplink
channel, data sent from subscriber station to base station. BWA uses point-to-multipoint or mesh
access. The actual wireless broadband protocol used determines the technical requirements such as
frequency, bandwidth, and operating range. WiMAX and IEEE 802.16e is a BWA solution that
supports bandwidth rates up to 70 MBps and coverage radius of 5 miles on average. The original
IEEE 802.16 standard was released in October 2001 and only supported line-of sight operations. It
was later ratied in 802.16a, January 2003, and 802.16-2004, October 2004, to include non-line-of-
sight frequencies, 2-11 GHz [25]. The standard was modied again in December 2005, 802.16e, to
support mobility.
IEEE 802.16e-2005 standard operates in the 2-66 GHz frequency range. The use of scalable
orthogonal frequency division multiple-access (SOFDMA) allows for scalable channel bandwidth
from 1.25 to 20 MHz [36] and tolerance to multi-path fading. This multiplexing technique is based
on orthogonal frequency division multiple-access (OFDMA) where bandwidth is subdivided into
multiple frequency sub-carriers and allows for multiple access by multiplexing data streams from
multiple users onto downlink and uplink sub-channels [8]. Figure 2.1 [8] shows the structure of an
OFDMA frame including the use of symbols and sub-channels. The standard supports Time Division
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Duplexing (TDD) and full and half-duplex Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD) and frame sizes
between 2.5 and 20 ms. It also uses dierent modulation schemes to adapt to channel conditions,
including binary phase shift keying (BPSK), quaternary PSK (QPSK), 16-quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM), and 64-QAM [32].
Figure 2.1: OFDMA Frame structure with sub-channels and symbols [8]
The WiMAX forum, which includes Airspan, Alcatel, Alvarion, Fujitsu, Intel, OFDM Fo-
rum, Proxim, and Siemens [36], was formed to determine an industry standard to promote equipment
interoperability. The WiMAX forum serves the same purpose for the IEEE 802.16 standard as the
Wireless Fidelity Alliance (Wi-Fi) does for IEEE 802.11. The industry standard includes specic
proles based on IEEE 802.16. For point-to-point and point-to-multipoint systems, Release-1 Mobile
WiMAX proles cover 5, 7, 8.75, and 10 MHz channel bandwidths for licensed worldwide spectrum
allocations in the 2.3 GHz, 2.5 GHz, 3.3 GHz and 3.5 GHz frequency bands. The only frame size
and duplexing currently supported in WiMAX proles is 5 ms and TDD [8].
Additionally, IEEE 802.16e supports ve quality-of-service (QoS) classes: Unsolicited Grant
Service (UGS), real-time Polling Service (rtPS), non-real-time Polling Service (nrtPS), Best Eort
(BE), and extended real-time Polling Service (ertPS) [26]. QoS is used to exibly support simulta-
neous use of a diverse set of IP services [9]. All classes other than UGS use the bandwidth request
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procedure via the uplink channel for SSs to request access to the network. Contentions, data col-
lisions on the network, are a problem in the uplink channel during bandwidth requests and are
not an issue in the downlink channel [25]. There are two mechanism used in WiMAX to handle
request contentions: centralized polling and contention-based random access [32]. The service class
determines whether contention-based or polling is used. Our work focuses on the contention-based
bandwidth request process known as Bandwidth Contention Resolution used in both BE and nrtPS
QoS classes.
The BE class is used by most Internet applications [26] and other application that require
no minimum data rate to properly function. Fore example, when the network is congested, BE nodes
typically cannot transmit packets until conditions improve. In BE, SS transmission requests may
be made via the BCR process or unicast polling. Though the standard does not mandate the BS to
provide unicast request opportunities [35]. The other QoS class, nrtPS, is best suited for variable
sized, delay tolerant data that requires a minimum data rate for functionality. The use of periodic
unicast request polling at interval of 1s or less provides the minimum data rate. Additionally, nrtPS
nodes can use the BCR process to request transmission. This class suits applications such as File
Transfer Protocl (FTP). Our work in nding and analyzing the BCR system parameters in hardware
is important for applications that use both these QoS classes.
2.1.1 MAC Layer
IEEE 802.16 uses the Open Systems Interconnection, OSI, layer model, Figure 2.2. The
protocol denes only the two lowest layers [35]:
 Physical link, layer 1 and
 Data link, layer 2.
The Media Access Control (MAC) layer of IEEE 802.16 is the core of the data link layer and
establishes and manages connections between the BS and SSs. This layer is connection-oriented,
all services map to connections that are assigned unique connection IDs (CIDs) [35]. The MAC
layer allows for dynamic resource allocation allowing the connection to adapt based on data or
transport needs. It is based on the DOCSIS standard and capable of supporting various types of
data simultaneously [8]. This layer can be subdivided into three sublayers: Convergence Sublayer
(CS), Common Part Sublayer (CPS), and the Security Sublayer.
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Figure 2.2: IEEE 802.16 and the OSI Model
The convergence sublayer interfaces with upper layers of the OSI model and prepares in-
formation for MAC layer handling when transmitting data and strips remaining MAC layer in-
formation when receiving. Essentially it accepts trac from other networking protocols such as
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet), Internet protocol (IP), point-to-point
protocol (PPP), etc. [35]. Separate parts of the CS handle ATM and packet-based trac. In between
the physical layer and CS MAC layer, lays the CPS.
The CPS is the heart of the MAC standard. In this sublayer, bandwidth allocation, connec-
tion establishment, and maintenance of the connection is handled. This includes scheduling, QoS
management, resource radio management (RRM), and frame construction. There are many dened
MAC management messages that allow the CPS to communicate with SS. Most of these messages
were dened in the IEEE 802.16-2004 standard [16] with a few additional messages for handling
mobility dened later in the IEEE-802.16-e standard. A list of these management messages can be
found in Appendix A.
During initialization, the CPS establishs three types of management connections between
the BS and SS prior to any data connections [39]. These connections include the basic, primary
management, and secondary management connections. The basic connection is not encrypted and
is for delay sensitive MAC management messages. The primary connection is also for MAC man-
agement messages but handles messages that are time tolerant. Lastly, the secondary management
connection uses IP datagrams and carries standard-based messages, DHCP, TFTP, SNMP, etc. Ad-
ditionally, there are specic CIDs for initial ranging, broadcast and multicast messages [39]. The
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initial ranging CID is 0x0000 and broadcast CID is 0xFFFF, all other CIDs are assigned in between
these two special case CIDs. Our work is particularly concerned with the broadcast connection,
0xFFFF, because the BCR system parameters are broadcast to SSs. The following section will
detail the broadcast message that carries them.
The security sublayer is a critical element of the MAC. This layer is an improvement from
the MAC security sublayer of 802.11 [25] with many added security features to protect the integrity
of the SS and the network addressing aws in the previous wireless standard. The security for mobile
WiMAX networks as described in [8] requires the following:
 Strong mutual device authentication,
 All commonly deployed authentication mechanisms based on consistent and extensible authen-
tication framework,
 Data integrity, replay protections, condentiality and non-repudiation with applicable key
lengths,
 Use of MS initiated security measures such as VPNs, and
 Standard secure IP address management.
To meet the above requirement, this sublayer can be divided into two main components:
data encapsulation and key management [35]. Data encapsulation is used to secure data packets
as they travel over the network. This component includes multiple encryption and authentication
algorithms and rules for applying them to data payloads. Key management implements Privacy Key
Management (PKM) protocol to safely exchange keys for authentication and, additionally, control
of access to certain services. The IEEE 802.16e security specications have been improved from
IEEE 802-16-2004 to better secure WiMAX and address further security issues of mobile nodes. For
example, the 2004 standard used PKMv.1, which uses one-way authentication, only authenticating
the SSs. IEEE 802.16e improved security by using PKMv.2, which supports mutual authentication
using certicates to authenticate both SS and BS. Also, as part of the IEEE 802.16 standard, security
associations (SA) are dened and used. An SA is the set of information that is shared between the
BS and SS to support secure communications. The SA can be shared between the BS and a single
SS or between the BS and multiple SSs. The SA establishes the Cryptographic Suite (the type of
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encryption, authentication, TEK exchange) that will be used. A summary of the various security
protocols implemented in IEEE 802.16 and 802.16e is presented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: IEEE 802.16 and 802.16e security protocol block diagram
Lastly, the physical layer species the conguration and operation for the physical medium.
This includes signal type, modulation and demodulation, transmission power, etc [35]. Many of
these requirements are detailed in Section 2.1. The physical layer is one option that would allow
us to change the BCR system parameters, if the correct equipment and facilities were available.
This requires constructing and transmitting a spoofed UCD message with the correct BSID and the
desired system parameters. We do not have the ability to use such resources for this study. Instead
we are looking at MAC management messages and man-in-the-middle attacks on the messages. This
will be described in Section 6.3.
2.1.2 Uplink: UCD and UL-MAP
The MAC messages that are particularly important to our work are the uplink map, UL-
MAP, and uplink channel descriptor, UCD. These two management messages carry a variety of
information for SSs, including system parameters, transmission request opportunities, and trans-
mission grants. The BS transmits them in the downlink subframes periodically [35]. As pictured
in Figure 2.4, the UL-MAP follows either the downlink map (DL-MAP), if one exists, or the frame
control header (FCH). If the UCD message exists in the subframe, it will follow the UL-MAP pre-
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ceded by a DCD, if there is one. These messages are included with the rst downlink burst following
the FCH.
Figure 2.4: WiMAX downlink channel
The UL-MAP tells each SS when they can transmit and when transmission request oppor-
tunities are available. UL-MAP's contain the following:
 Uplink Channel ID, identier of the uplink channel that message refers to,
 UCD Count, is equal to value of Conguration Change Count of UCD (UCD describes the
uplink burst proles for the specic UL-MAP),
 Allocation Start Time, eective start time of uplink allocation specied in UL-MAP, and
 Map Information Elements (IEs), contents dependent on PHY specication but denes uplink
bandwidth allocation.
For the Map IEs, each uplink bandwidth allocation starts at the given oset relative to
allocation start time and is specied in physical slot (PS) units [16]. The PS is dependent on the
physical layer. The Uplink Interval Usage Code (UIUC) indicates the burst prole that should
be used for each allocation. The UIUCs are dened in the UCD messages. The UCD Count
parameter assures that the correct UCD message is used to translate the UIUC into burst proles.
A visualization of UL-MAP message can be seen in Figure 2.5.
As seen in the UL-MAP, the UCD denes the characteristics of an uplink physical channel
with the UIUC. The maximum allowed period for UCD transmission is 10 s [16]. This message
carries system parameters used in contention resolution for SSs as well as uplink burst proles. The
following parameters must be included in the UCD:
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Figure 2.5: UL-MAP IE construction
 Conguration Change Count: incremented each time the values of channel descriptor change.
Allows for SS to quickly determine whether or not to process rest of descriptor. [16]
 Ranging Backo Start: initial backo window size for initial ranging, expressed as power of 2.
Can be set between 0-15. Most signicant bits (MSB) not used.
 Ranging Backo End: nal backo window size for initial ranging, expressed as power of 2.
Can be set between 0-15. MSB not used.
 Request Backo Start: initial backo window size for bandwidth requests for contention reso-
lution, expressed as power of 2. Can be set between 0-15. MSB not used.
 Request Backo End: nal backo window size for bandwidth requests for contention resolu-
tion, expressed as power of 2. Can be set between 0-15. MSB not used. [16]
 Contention-based reservation timeout: time that SS waits to see transmission grant before
sending another transmission request
 Bandwidth request opportunity size: size in PS of physical burst an SS may use to transmit
Ranging Request message in contention ranging request
Additionally, for this study the ranging process in not examined. This leaves four important
parameters dened in the UCD message for our study: request backo end, request backo start,
contention-based reservation timeout, and bandwidth request opportunity size. All four of these
parameters are used in the Bandwidth Contention Resolution.
The UCD also denes the proles of the UIUC. These denitions are TLV encoded. This
type of encoding will be covered in Section 2.1.3. There are 20 available modulation and coding
schemes for uplink burst proles [35]. The format of the UCD message is pictured in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: UCD message construction
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Another important aspect of the UL-MAP and UCD message is they are needed to keep
a SS locked on to a specic uplink channel. An SS is considered to have valid uplink parameters
as long as it continues to successfully receive the UL-MAP and UCD messages. If at least one of
these is not received within 50s, the SS will not use that uplink channel. The standard species the
time limit by equation 2.1. The UCD maximum interval is 10s leading to a maximum time limit for
receiving a UL-MAP or UCD of 50 seconds.
[max time interval ULMAP or UCD] = 5  [UCD Interval Maximum] (2.1)
We will see later why this information is important. Section 7.3 describes a technique for
possibly temporary manipulating the BCR system parameters by taking advantage of this time
interval.
2.1.3 TLV
MAC messages in IEEE 802.16e use type, length, value (TLV) encoding. This encoding
scheme is a way of storing data to facilitate quick parsing and is a type of Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
that is dened by the International Telecommunication Unions Telecommunication Standardization
Sector (ITU-T) X.690 standard [23] for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) encoding. For each
parameter encoded as TLV, the rst byte identies the parameter type, the following byte(s) are
indicative of the total length in bytes of the value eld, and the last are the parameter value [19].
The size of the Length eld follows the denite form of the X.690 standard [16]. The denite
form denes the length of the Length eld as 1 byte if the Value eld is less than 127 bytes. The
MSB of the single byte is set to 0 and the seven least signicant bits (LSB) indicate total length
in bytes of Value eld. On the other hand, if the length of Value eld is more than 127 bytes, the
Length eld is one byte larger than the needed bytes to indicate the correct length. The MSB of
the rst byte is set to 1 with the remaining LSB specifying the remaining number of bytes of the
Length eld. The remaining bytes denote the total length in bytes of the Value Field.
The parameter type indicates the encoding rules that are used. IEEE 802.16 uses the
same type for various messages, but within the message unique TLV types are used. The system
parameters encoded within these messages are dierent and the system knows which it is currently
handling, therefore it can determine the explicit encoding used. For parameters that are TLV
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encoded and are referenced by multiple message types, a globally unique TLV type is used to
guarantee uniqueness. Examples of such parameters are transmit power, service ow descriptors,
and security information.
TLV encoding is commonly used for physical layer specication in IEEE-802.16 MAC man-
agement messages. These types of encoding begin at type 150 and go up. Non physical layer
encodings begin at type 1. This scheme is used in the UCD message to encode the UCID burst pro-
les and the Radio Resource Management (RRM) messages. Additionally, it is used for conguration
parameters such as software update, hardware version, DHCP, etc., and other MAC management
messages but the UCD and RRM messages are the only TLV encodings relevant to this research.
In the UCD message, contention-based reservation timeout, bandwidth request opportunity
size, ranging request opportunity size and frequency is encoded along with burst prole information,
ranging information, and bandwidth request codes. The BCR system parameters are TLV types 24
for contention-based reservation timeout, bandwidth request opportunity size and ranging request
opportunity size, respectively. Frequency is encoded as TLV type 5. Types 150 -172 are used to
encode OFDMA settings. For the burst proles of OFDMA, encoding types 150 - 152 are used again.
The code type and modulation are type 150 and the Value eld from 0 - 25 represents twenty-six
dierent modulation schemes with 26-255 being reserved. This encoding can be found in Section 11
of the IEEE 802.16-2004 standard [16].
IEEE 802.16e dened new TLV encodings in addition to encoding dened in IEEE 802.16-
2004. New types include RRM messages and Full UCD Setting. More information about these two
encoding types can be found in Table 2.1 and 2.2 [10]. Further detail of Full UCD Setting encoding
can be found in [17].
The UCD message alone, separate from the RRM message, contains TLV encoded parame-
ters as well. It was originally hypothesized that we may need to search and/or decode the encoded
information to determine with certainty that they encapsulate the BCR system parameters, and
this is the purpose of presenting the information in this section. Upon further investigation using
the techniques detailed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we did not nd any indication of the BCR system
parameters that required further analysis of items such as TLV encoded parameters.
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Table 2.1: IEEE 802.16e new TLV type, RRM BS Info
RRM BS INFO
Type 159
Length Variable
Value Compound
Description Contains a description of BS parameters which are not related to a specic MS.
Elements (Sub-TLVs)
TLV Name BS ID
Available Radio Resource DL
Total slots DL
Available Radio Resource UL
Total slots UL
Radio Resource Fluctuation
DCD/UCD Conguration Change Count
DCD Setting
UCD Setting
Full DCD Setting
Full UCD Setting
Use This TLV
RRM Spare Capacity Rpt, RRM Neighbor BS Resource Status Update, RRM Radio Cong Update Rpt.
Table 2.2: IEEE 802.16e new TLV type, Full UCD Setting
FULL UCD SETTING
Type 73
Length Variable
Value Compound
Description
This is an IEEE802.16e-2005 dened TLV. The UCD settings is a TLV value that
encapsulates a UCD message (excluding the generic MAC header and CRC)
that may be transmitted in the advertised BS downlink channel. This
information is intended to enable fast synchronization of the MS with the
advertised BS downlink.
Parent TLV(s) RRM BS Info
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2.2 Bandwidth Contention Resolution
All of our work revolves around the Bandwidth Contention Resolution (BCR) process and
the system parameters used to control the execution of this process. The work in [7] used the NS-2
simulator to analyze the eects on average throughput and packet-loss rate when a set of attacker
SS's do not follow the BS's settings of the BCR system parameters. Our study desires to take the
analysis one step further and conduct the same experiments in hardware. This is a challenging
task since the protocol and hardware implementations do not directly allow for such behavior. An
explanation of the BCR process will clarify two things: why manipulating the system parameters
could adversely aect other users on the network and why the BS controls the values of them.
In the Bandwidth Contention Resolution process, a SS has system parameters that are set
periodically by a broadcast message from the BS known as the Uplink Channel Descriptor (UCD).
These parameters are initially acquired during SS initialization as the second step after nding a
downlink channel and synchronizing with the BS [16]. The steps during initialization are carried
out in the following order:
1. Scan for downlink channel and synchronize with BS,
2. Obtain transmit parameters from UCD message,
3. Perform ranging,
4. Negotiate capabilities,
5. Authorization and key exchange,
6. Registration,
7. IP connectivity,
8. Time of day,
9. Operational parameters, and
10. Set up connection.
The UCD denes characteristics of the uplink channel and burst proles. The BS tracks
multiple aspects of the network including number of users and channel conditions. The BS selects
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uplink characteristics and burst proles that provide the best and/or needed performance required
by each SS. The BS also modies these parameters as network conditions vary to maintain the
performance. Some of the parameters included in UCD and set by the BS are request backo start,
request backo end, ranging backo start, ranging backo end, contention-based reservation timeout
and bandwidth request opportunity size. When a SS needs bandwidth allocation it must request
it from the BS, and these previous parameters control the binary truncated exponential backo
algorithms used in Bandwidth Contention Resolution. This process handles the issue of two SS
transmitting information at the same time and/or SS transmitted data not being received by the
BS. It is a means of handling the potential collisions on the network.
In BCR, when a SS has data they want to transmit they randomly choose a number in the
range of [0, backo start -1] and defers a number of contention request transmission opportunities
equal to the randomly selected value before transmitting their request. The contention request
transmission opportunities are dened in the UL-MAP, uplink map, which also denes bandwidth
allocation for SSs. The UL-MAP, like the UCD message, is sent by the BS periodically to all SSs.
After sending a request, the SS checks each UL-MAP message for a pre-dened time period that is
determined by contention-based reservation timeout parameter to check if transmission was granted.
If no data grant is seen, the SS will increase backo start by one, doubling the range for the randomly
selected variable [19] and repeat the process. This continues until backo start equals backo end,
at which the protocol data unit (PDU) is dropped and the process restarts with the next PDU [39].
There are two situations that can ultimately stop the bandwidth contention process. First,
transmission opportunity is granted. Second, the number of retries executed by the SS is equal to
request retry. If transmission opportunity is not granted before one of these scenarios occur, the
request is considered denied and the data is dropped. With an understanding how each system
parameter aects the contention process, hopefully it is clear how they can be manipulated to limit
transmission opportunities of other SS. For example, if one was to set backo start very low, say 1,
then they will always be able to send there transmission request in the rst or second contention
request transmission opportunity. If this SS continued to send requests in could limit the ability of
other SS to transmit there requests. Next we will look at software simulations that actual analyzed
this particular system parameters as well as others and discuss the results.
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2.3 NS-2 Software Simulations
Deng and Brooks conducted software simulations that analyzed the BCR system parameter
eects on SS average throughput and packet-loss in [7]. These simulations were conducted with
the network simulator, NS-2, of the Information Sciences Institute. The NS-2 is a discrete event
simulator targeted at networking research with support for TCP, routing, and multicast protocols
over wired and wireless networks [22]. Under the guidance of Brooks, this study has attempted to
replicate these simulations in hardware. The following section will summarize the NS-2 simulations
and results while explaining the experimental design and analysis used. This design and analysis is
also used for the hardware experiments detailed in Section 3.4.
2.3.1 Factorial Experimental Design
Factorial experimental design is a technique that produces substantial, reliable information
from the a minimal set of data and minimum number of test trials. Data for all combination of factors
is collected. This produces robust results and signicant information about individual parameters
and parameter interactions. With this method, the tests for any one factor setting contains values
collected for all settings of other factors, allowing higher certainty that obtained results are due only
to specic factor settings rather than other varying factors that are treated as noise. This provides
signicant information about the parameter and higher certainty of eects it produces. Furthermore,
the ability to analyze the eect of parameter interaction on a result is benecial as well.
The operating characteristic curves of type II error probability [30] are used to determine
when to reject and accept a null hypotheses. The characteristic curves model the extent to which the
null hypothesis is false for a statistical test of a xed sample size. For this study, the null hypothesis
is a parameter's settings have equally no eect on the result. The alternative hypothesis is that at
least one of the settings does have an eect on the result. Statistical tests are used to quantify and
validate the hypothesis as we will see in Section 2.3.2.
We construct our experimental design so that the null hypothesis should be rejected with
probability of 95% producing a signicance level, , of 5%, if the dierence in average throughput
of all SSs between two values of a parameter is as great as 5000. We assume standard deviation of
throughput for all SSs is 2000 bps. We require, a condence of 99% or greater, equivalently a type
II error, , less than 1%.
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In experimental design, determining the correct number of replications is critical. Using
number of factors, X, levels for each factor, Y, the desired , and Chart V. Operating Characteristic
Curves for Fixed Eects Model Analysis of Variance [30] one can nd . With standard deviation
and maximum dierence between parameter values, the following equation, 2.3.1, can be used to
determine number of replications, n, to assure .
2 =
n(Y (X   1))(50002)
XY (20002)
(2.2)
2.3.2 ANOVA Analysis
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) [42] was used on simulation results to isolate which param-
eters and/or parameter combinations aect SS throughput and vulnerability to DoS most signi-
cantly. Multiple factor ANOVA analyzed the 1st, 2nd and 3rd order parameter eects on network
performance. First order eects quantify how much an individual parameter alters the outcome,
and second and third order eects quantify additional inuence of interactions of two and three
parameters respectively.
To understand ANOVA, allow response Y to be aected by two parameters A and B. A has
a treatments and B has b. Two-way ANOVA compares the eects of treatments of each parameter
and the parameter interaction. It tests the equality of treatments of A, dierent a's, equality of
treatments of B, dierent b's, and whether A and B interact, by nding the sum of squares (SoS),
mean square (MS), and applying the F-test to calculate F0, the F statistic. The variable F0 follows
an F-distribution and the questions is if it follows the same F-distribution as the entire data set.
The F-test nds the distribution variance of one specic parameter, in this case A, B, or interaction
of A and B. This variance is then compared to the distribution of variance for the entire data set to
determine if they are the equivalent. If they are, than the parameter's settings are not signicant on
data. One can consider F0 is the probability that a random process could produce a value at least
as extreme as the observed value.
To determine whether or not to reject the null hypothesis one rst nds F, the value for the
desired signicance level from the F-distribution that ts the entire sample set. This F-distribution
that is appropriate is dierent depending on whether we are analyzing rst, second, or third order
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interactions. Next, F0 is calculated based on the the variance for the specic parameter's subset of
data. If F0 is greater than F that parameter is signicant. A correlation to F0 is the p-value. The
p-value is the probability that an F statistic is greater than F0, P (F > F0). If the p-value is less
than  than the parameters is signicant.
To more intuitively quantify the amount of variance seen R-SQUARE is used. R-SQUARE
is commonly used in data analysis and interpreted as percent of variance in data explained by a
parameter, X [30]. Factor X can be a parameter or parameter interaction. The equation for R-
SQUARE is presented in 2.3.2. For R-SQUARE, normal distribution of error is assumed. The
experimental design confounds readings from multiple factors so when a parameter signicantly
aects the result, it is likely that the values for other factors do not follow normal distribution. This
may lower the signicance of the test [30], but the F-test, which we use to determine whether or not
a parameter is signicant initially, is robust to the normality assumption and only slightly aected.
R2 =
SoSX
SoStotal
(2.3)
Two-way ANOVA is used to analyze average throughput for each SS overall replications.
For rst order interactions, the null hypothesis can be summarized as the average throughput for SSs
for dierent treatments of a parameter are equal. For second and third order interactions, the null
hypothesis is that no parameter interaction exists. We still use the same criteria earlier stated to
determine whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis. The hypothesis being rejected indicates
specic treatment of the parameter has signicant aect on throughput or parameter interaction
occurs, the alternative hypothesis. Using these statistical tests, an abundant amount of information
about the eect of parameters is derived from the data.
2.3.3 Software Simulations
Unlike past work in WiMAX security vulnerabilities, [1,26,31,43], this research investigates
how DoS attacks can be conducted using WiMAX system parameter settings. The parameters exam-
ined are bw backo start, bw request retry, and frame duration. Additionally, one other parameter
is considered: attacker to user ratio (number of attacker/user). The Bandwidth Contention Resolu-
tion process, as explained in Section 2.2, uses bw backo start, bw backo end, and bw request retry
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to determine the delay an SS waits in between transmission requests and the number of times that
an SS will transmit bandwidth requests before dropping data. If an attacker station ignores the BS
mandated setting for these values they can potentially give themselves priority for sending trans-
mission requests which results in more granted opportunities to transmit data. This can adversely
aect regular user SS by limiting their opportunities to either transmit their bandwidth requests
and/or data.
Software simulations were conducted using the NS-2 simulator [22] by Deng [7] to examine
the eect of setting each of these parameters on client and attacker SSs to a low, medium, and high
value. Please see Table 1 for parameter settings, the settings that begin with dos refer to attacker
SSs where as settings that begin with bw refer to client SSs. The NS-2 simulator was congured to
imitate a WiMAX network that has a single BS, centrally located, and 100 SSs, which include both
client SSs and attacker SSs, placed along a 150 meter radius of the BS. Connected through a wired
interface to the BS is a sink node that acts as a receiver for all trac. The bandwidth was set to
10 MHz and each SS used a UDP constant bit rate trac generator to send 1492 B packets to the
sink node at intervals of 0.5 s. The system was congured in such a way to avoid packet dropping.
Table 2.3: Software simulation parameters
Parameter Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
frame duration (s) 0.004 0.01 0.02
number of attacker/user 20/80 50/50 80/20
dos backo start 1 3 5
dos request retry 2 6 10
bw backo start 1 3 5
bw request retry 2 6 10
Seven replications of each parameter setting combination were conducted for a total of 5103
experiments. Throughput and packet-loss measurements were collected for each replication, and
ANOVA [42], analysis of variance, was used to determine how these parameters and the parameter
interactions aected throughput. The results of these simulations and further explanation of the
ANOVA analysis can be found in [7]. Figure 2.7 is a visual representation of the results. In this
image, we see that 31% of the variance in throughput is caused by frame duration, followed by 22%
from the client SSs request retry. Lastly, the client SSs backo start is responsible for over 5% of
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variance and taking the combination of these three parameters and their interactions accounts for
86% of the variance in average throughput.
Figure 2.7: Piechart of ns-2 results for average throughput
ANOVA analysis indicates that frame duration and bw request retry and their combination
aect throughput most dramatically. The aects of other parameters are minor in comparison.
Other conclusions that can be made include:
 Throughput decreases drastically when frame duration is set to a value of 2 ms.
 Throughput increases drastically when bw request retry is increased from 2 to 6.
 The ratio of attackers to users does not signicantly aect the impact of DoS attacks.
Additionally, one last point to highlight is that it is the client SS's settings of request retry
and backo start that contributes greatly to the variance seen in average throughput. This suggest
that the client's settings of the system parameters is what matters most in decreasing the vulner-
ability to an attack that manipulates the BCR system parameters. The analysis indicates that a
high level setting of bw request retry provides the best throughput. The other two client settings,
frame duration and bw backo start both should be set to low values to provide robustness to a
DoS attack of this type. The best settings for these are not surprising and are easily explained by
the BCR process. The high setting of bw request retry allows a SS to complete multiple attempts
to transmit providing more robustness if there is disturbances on the network. The low setting of
bw backo start produces a shorter wait time for sending the a transmission request, and ultimately
27
if the request fails, produces a shorter time till the next attempt. Lastly, a small frame duration
allows more packets to be sent producing a better probability for some of the packets to get through.
2.4 GENI and ORBIT
GENI, global environment for network innovation, is a virtual laboratory for at-scale net-
working experimentation supported by the National Science Foundation. The backbone network is
constructed of National Lambda Rail (NLR) [34] and Internet2 [24] links creating a high capacity
backbone to support multiple GRE tunnels for experimentation. The main object of this virtual
laboratory is to allow researchers to explore future Internet technology. Many other applications
have become possibly with such a large-scale network for experimentation such as wireless, sensor
networks, and security research.
ORBIT, open-access research testbed for next-generation wireless networks [45], is one en-
tity of the GENI network. ORBIT is ran by Rutger University's WINLAB and provides eleven
dierent software-dened radio testbeds. The resources are remotely accessible, completely con-
gurable, support experimental scalability and reproducibility, and extensive measurement. There
are two integral parts that allow this, the ORBIT management framework (OMF) [40] and ORBIT
measurement library (OML) [44]. Both of these services are stored on a single server known as the
OMF/OML server. OMF includes software and hardware that allows an experimenter to write an
experiment in a high-level language and then translate it to control the resources to carry out the
experiment. OMF handles the translation and control of execution of the experiment.
2.4.1 OMF and OML
The basic OMF framework includes the following software and hardware:
 Support servers, repositories,
 Collection server (CS),
 Disk-loading service,
 Node handler,
 Node agent,
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 Experiment controller service, and
 Chasis manager (CM)/ Aggregate manager service.
Figure 2.8: ORBIT Management Framework [33]
A block diagram of the ORBIT framework can be seen in Figure 2.8 [33]. Support servers
compromise servers for web services and experimentation and data storage. The latter servers are
called repositories in the ORBIT system. Predened applications such as trac generators and
trac receivers, i.e. ORBIT trac generator (OTG) and ORBIT trac receiver (OTR), have
been developed and are stored in the repository for experimenter use. The collection server stores
measurement data using an SQLite database. The node handler and node agent work together to
control the experiment via the Experiment Controller Service. The disk-loading service enables quick
re-imaging of hard disks on individual nodes [40]. The node agent is on the end nodes and the node
handler, stored on the server, sends experiment scripts to each node via multicast messages. Lastly,
experiment controller service and the aggregate manager services are stored on the OMF/OML
server. The experiment controller, as mentioned before, coordinates the node handler and node
agent. The CM has a dedicated Ethernet connection to each node that allows it to monitor status
of hardware and remotely reset and power on and o each node.
OML enables measurements to be easily integrated into the user experiment scripts. It
is a distributed client-server software framework that enables real-time collection of data from the
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various applications being executed during an experiment [45]. The library denes data structures
and functions for making and handling measurements in XML data reduced (XDR) format. This
includes transmitting and receiving and encoding and decoding measurements [44]. OML oers
measurement metrics and various lters that can be applied to these metrics. Metrics include rssi,
throughput, pkt size, xmit rate, sender ip to name a few. Example of lters would be average, sum,
etc.
Additional hardware and software for testbeds include virtual machines and Linux 2.6.35
kernel nodes. The KVM virtual machines and the virtual machine aggregate manager are stored on
the VM server. Lastly, to complete the wireless system for WiMAX enabled beds there is a NEC
base station transceiver system, consisting of an indoor and outdoor unit, and base station servers.
The servers store software that enable integration and functionality of the entire WiMAX system and
manage multiple remote access, operation, and conguration of the network. This includes CLICK,
a software dened router, the ASN-GW Controller, and the WiMAX RF aggregate manager that
are stored on the base station server.
The Linux nodes are custom built system that include a 1 GHz VIA C3 processor that
has 512 MB of RAM, a 20 GB hard disk, two 100BaseT Ethernet ports - one for control and one
for experiment, two wireless mini-PCI 802.11a/b/g interfaces, and an integrated chassis manager
that works with the CM for remote monitoring of hardware. WiMAX enabled nodes include Intel
Centrino Advanced + Wireless 6250 USB devices. The user has root access to the Linux nodes and
they can be congured with whatever modules and software an experimenter desires as long as it is
supported by the hardware. The virtual machine image can be saved and stored on the repository
for imaging of nodes in future.
The NEC base station is proprietary but user congurable. The BCR system parameters
are just one of many parameters an experimenter can set to dictate BS behavior. Changing these
parameters on the BS, changes the parameter on all SS. The conguration that is passed to the BS,
it the same conguration that the BS will pass to every SS on the network via MAC management
messages. Though this is useful for a WiMAX experimenter, it does not allow for any malicious ac-
tivity to simulated. Therefore, we still needed to nd a way to set the system parameters on attacker
nodes separate from the BS settings of system parameter. An exhaustive list of the experimenter
congurable BS parameters can be found at:
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http://wimax.orbit-lab.org/wiki/WiMAX/17/00Wireless#WirelessControlServices
The parameters that are important to this study our listed in Table 2.4 with explanation of
their importance. The remaining sections will detail experiments and investigations that have been
conducted using the ORBIT resources.
Table 2.4: ORBIT base station parameters used
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION DEFAULT
reqbackostart
Initial backo window size for contention bandwidth requests, expressed as a
power of 2. This is encoded in the UCD message in the MAC layer. [0..15] 3
reqbackoend
Final backo window size for contention bandwidth requests, expressed as a
power of 2. This is encoded in the UCD message in the MAC layer. [0..15] 15
dcducdinterv Time interval between UCD and DCD mesages (units: frames) [10..4000] 200
odunoiseoor Outdoor unit noise oor [0..100] 40
2.5 Summary
This chapter summarized the details of the IEEE 802.16e standard and WiMAX protocol.
Coverage of the MAC layer, with specic focus on the UCD and UL-MAP messages, and TLV
encoding was presented. The information in these sections communicate the importance of our study
of WiMAX security and the protocol intricacies that will be used in nding and understanding the
BCR system parameters. The security of the MAC layer was briey explained to provide further
context to the previous Section 1.3, past work in WiMAX security. Next, an exhaustive look at the
BCR system parameters was given to help understand the hypothesis that system parameters have
potential to be used as a DoS attacks and why modifying them in hardware has been a tedious job.
Additionally, the original work, that was the catalyst for this study, was presented and
explained followed by an overview of the hardware, software, and facilities used for the hardware im-
plementation. This information, as well as Section 2.1.2, serve as an introduction to the experiments
discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 3, and will allow one to fully comprehend the methods we
have used in our search for the BCR system parameters in hardware. These methods are presented
in the remaining Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Chapter 3
ORBIT Testbeds
As eluded to in Chapter 2 and Section 2.3, WiMAX hardware experiments were a natural
progression after software simulations. There were multiple motivations for hardware experimenta-
tion. First, carrying out the same experiments on real hardware would provide a good comparison to
software and hopefully validate the software results. Second, it would provide analysis of the reliabil-
ity of a popular software network simulator, the NS-2. Additionally, all the reasons for investigating
the BCR parameters in [7] were motivation for carrying out hardware experiments. Being able to
replicate attacker behavior in hardware proved to be hard. While we applied various techniques to
nd a method that would allow us to mimic their actions, we analyzed the eect of BCR system
parameters when no malicious activity is simulated.
This chapter presents these hardware experiments which were conducted on the ORBIT
resources. We begin by introducing the experimental setup in the following section. Next, we look
at the two testbed environments, indoor and outdoor, that were used for these in Section 3.2 and
3.3 respectively. To conclude this chapter, the actual analysis of the experimental data of these two
environments is presented in Section 3.4 and the dierences seen in results is explained.
3.1 Introduction
A few changes were required for hardware experimentation though. We no longer consider
frame duration because it is xed at 5 ms due to restrictions of WiMAX certied equipment. Sec-
ondly, the NEC BS does not provide request retry as a congurable parameter. Backo end is used
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instead because, as explained in Section 2.2, both request retry and backo end determine when
packets are dropped. Additionally, for these experiments no malicious activity was simulated. In-
stead all WiMAX nodes use the same BCR system parameters. The parameters settings used for
these experiments can be seen in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Indoor vs outdoor experiment parameter settings
Parameter Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
frame duration (s) 0.005 0.005 0.005
dos backo start 1 3 5
dos backo end 2 6 10
WiMAX enabled resources at Rutgers University's WINLAB facilities are being used to
conduct hardware experiments. The resources are part of ORBIT [40], which is part of larger
infrastructure of the GENI network. ORBIT has two NEC WiMAX BSs that we are using for
our experiments. The SSs at ORBIT consist of laptops running Linux Kernel 2.6.35 with ntel R
Centrino R Advanced + Wireless 6250 devices providing WiMAX service. Experiments consists of
one BS, eight or more trac generating SSs, and one sink node directly connected to the BS that
acts as a receiver for all trac generated by SSs. The trac generating nodes use Constant Bit Rate
(CBR) generators, to transmit 1024 B UDP packets every 0.5 s. The OTG and OTR were used as
the transmitters and receiver. For each experiment, trac is generated for 120s and OML [44] is
used to collect measurements of the incoming trac at the receiving node.
3.2 Indoor Testbed
ORBIT provides an indoor BS and an outdoor BS. The indoor BS and its corresponding
WiMAX network have most environmental conditions controlled. The indoor BS, eight nodes that
can be congured to be a WiMAX network and an Ethernet sink node, are enclosed in a Faraday
Cage preventing outside interference from other wireless communication. Coaxial connections and
tunable attenuators imitate the air medium between the BS and SSs. The attenuators can be used to
simulate fading or varying signal strengths if desired, but no attenuation is used in our experiments.
The indoor testbed, with all attenuation set to zero, produces a fairly equal receive signal strength,
within +/- 2 dB, at each SS.
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Figure 3.1: ORBIT's indoor WiMAX testbed, Sandbox 4 [45]
3.3 Outdoor Testbed
The outdoor BS and testbed consists of forty plus SSs deployed at various locations through-
out Rutgers University's Busch Campus, Piscataway, New Jersey. The testbed includes both x
subscriber stations and mobile stations (MS). This testbed resembles a real WiMAX network with
SSs at various locations and distances from the BS and experiencing a wide range of receive sig-
nal strength. Transmission paths are vulnerable to environmental factors and there is an increased
amount of trac compared to the indoor testbed. For consistency, we use the same eight WiMAX
nodes and sink node in our experiments; the WiMAX nodes include node1-1 through node1-8 and
sink node is node 4-1.
3.4 Indoor vs Outdoor
The following quantitative and qualitative analysis of the indoor and outdoor testbeds is
based on the data that we have collected on both testbeds. The end of the previous section describes
the parameters of this data. Data has been collected and analyzed for 26 experiments on each
testbed. Table 3.4 presents the average throughput and packet-loss rate for all nodes involved in the
experiments for the outdoor and indoor testbeds. Refer to Appendix C for detailed results of each
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Figure 3.2: ORBIT's outdoor WiMAX testbed, Sandbox Outdoor
experiment run.
As expected, the data indicates that the indoor testbed achieves higher throughput for the
receiving node and has a lower dropped packet rate. The indoor testbed produces a fairly consistent
throughput for each SS with the average throughput for all eight nodes of 2031.2086 B/s and a range
of 11.4872 B/s. The average throughput for outdoor was only 14.325 B/s lower than indoor, but
the throughput range was much larger, 131.9 B/s.
Signicant performance dierences between nodes of the outdoor testbed are evident. For
example, node 7 performed worst with an average throughput of 1919.895 B/s in comparison to node
3s average of 2051.572 B/s. Reasons for this include increased trac activity from other parts of
network and varying receive signal strength (RSSI) at each SS. The largest recorded range of RSSI
for the outdoor nodes used in our experiments is 19 dB, -65 to -46 dBm. The results seen in the
outdoor environment, large throughput range and varying node performance, can be accounted for
by the environment factors that the outdoor testbed experiences that the indoor testbed does not.
The nodes that performed worse likely are further away from the BS operating with a lower receive
signal strength and/or experience such things as multipath fading.
Performance uctuation can also be seen between groups of experimental runs. ORBITs
network testbeds are still under development and are constantly undergoing modications to produce
better network performance and results. Implications of this will be discussed further in the following
35
Table 3.2: Average throughput and packet-loss
Testbed Node Avg. Throughput (B/s) Avg. Packet Loss (B/s)
IN
D
O
O
R
Node 1 2038.153823 15.42564103
Node 2 2035.856393 17.39487179
Node 3 2031.910245 21.00512821
Node 4 2030.59743 18.70769231
Node 5 2030.605125 18.05128205
Node 6 2028.964095 19.69230769
Node 7 2026.994868 21.66153846
Node 8 2026.666663 21.98974359
Receiver 16271.83728 161.4769231
O
U
T
D
O
O
R
Node 1 2020.079463 67.65714286
Node 2 2034.856374 40.22857143
Node 3 2051.571781 4.594871795
Node 4 2048 2.438095238
Node 5 2016.164103 59.12380952
Node 6 2047.015385 1.219047619
Node 7 1919.67179 237.1047619
Node 8 1997.784612 91.42857143
Receiver 16111.26115 504.6857143
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section.
The ANOVA analysis presented in Table 3.4, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 highlight the signicant dif-
ferences that are expected between an outdoor, real WiMAX network, and indoor, an ideal network,
environments. In these tables, X1 and X2 represent bw backo start and bw backo end, respec-
tively, SS is the sum of squares, DF is degrees of freedom and MS is mean square. F0 is the mean
square of the specic parameter divided by the mean square of error. In this test, the null hypothesis
is dierent levels of each parameter or parameter combination aect the throughput or packet-loss
rate equally, meaning that the value/s of the specic parameter or parameter combination does not
signicantly aect the measured quantity. A condence of 95% is used for our analysis,  equals
0.05, and determines when to accept or reject the null hypothesis.
Table 3.3: ANOVA table for average throughput, indoor
SOURCE SS DF MS F0 F Prob>F0 R-SQUARE
Backo start, X1 72.7 2 36.37 0.07 3.5915 0.9315 0.0046898
Backo end, X2 204.8 2 102.42 0.2 3.5915 0.82 0.013207
X1*X2 6536.4 4 1634.1 3.2 2.6547 0.0393 0.42145
Error 8673.5 17 510.2
Total 15509.2 25
Table 3.4: ANOVA table for average packet-loss rate, indoor
SOURCE SS DF MS F0 F Prob>F0 R-SQUARE
X1 131.2 2 65.6 0.14 3.5915 0.8671 0.0098891
X2 160.8 2 80.38 0.18 3.5915 0.84 0.012116
X1*X2 5237.9 4 1309.47 2.87 2.6547 0.0551 0.39479
Error 7757.4 17 456.32
Total 13267.6 25
If F0 is more than F, than the null hypothesis is rejected and that parameter or combination
of parameters does have signicant aect on the quantity measured, this is known as the F-test.
Similarly, if the probability that an F is greater than F0 (Prob > F0), also known as the p-value,
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Table 3.5: ANOVA table for average throughput, outdoor
SOURCE SS DF MS F0 F Prob>F0 R SQUARE
Backo start, X1 94.1 2 47.06 0.2 3.5915 0.9798 0.0020603
Backo end, X2 1798.8 2 899.4 0.39 3.5915 0.6824 0.039373
X1*X2 4872.6 4 1218.16 0.53 2.6547 0.7158 0.10666
Error 39115.1 17 2300.89
Total 45685.9 25
Table 3.6: ANOVA table for average packet-loss rate, outdoor
SOURCE SS DF MS F0 F Prob>F0 R SQUARE
X1 99.4 2 49.69 0.02 3.5915 0.9785 0.0021924
X2 1785.8 2 892.91 0.39 3.5915 0.6824 0.039395
X1*X2 4792.2 4 1198.05 0.52 2.6547 0.7193 0.10571
Error 38842.8 17 2284.87
Total 45331.5 25
is less than , the null hypothesis should be rejected as well. The R-Square value is dened as the
percent of variance explained by a parameter or combination of parameters.
When comparing F0, F, and R-Square, one can conclude that bw backo start and bw backo end
and their combination does not have any signicant aect on throughput or packet-loss rate in the
outdoor environment. Interestingly, the second-order eect of combining these parameters does have
a signicant aect in the indoor environment. Neither parameter alone will aect throughput or
packet-loss rate, but the combination of the parameters can be signicant in ideal WiMAX network
but none are signicant in real WiMAX networks. These results can be visualized in Figure 3.3.
The R-SQUARE values for both indoor and outdoor are plotted in this gure. Despite this, it is
crucial to note that according to ANOVA analysis the outdoor results are not signicant.
These results also show the importance of real hardware network testbeds like ORBIT and
GENI for system testing. According to our results, the environmental issues play a signicant role
in determining the aects of system parameters. When environmental conditions are modeled the
signicance of certain parameters change. For complete system testing, this is essential to know.
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Figure 3.3: Piechart of indoor and outdoor test results
Many software simulators only allow replication of ideal networks and they are not able to mimic
conditions of multipath fading and other environmental factors. With such software simulators, it
is very critical to consider hardware experimentation as well to fully understand the eects.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents in detail the WiMAX network environments of Rutgers University's
ORBIT testbeds. These are the testbeds used for all of our hardware experiments and investigation
into the BCR system parameters in hardware. Additionally, an analysis of the indoor and outdoor
environments, testbeds SB4 and outdoor, was presented. The analysis did not simulate malicious
activity. Instead it looked at the eect of dierent settings of two BCR system parameters, back-
o start and backo end. The individual parameter settings had no signicant aect on the average
throughput of the SSs, but the interaction of these two parameters did aect throughput in the in-
door environment only. This magnies an interesting dierence between indoor and outdoor network
testing.
The indoor testbed is controlled to produce almost ideal network conditions and this is
similar to the ideal conditions that software network simulators create. The outdoor testbed is a
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real WiMAX network. The varying results we see between these two environments exemplies the
importance of hardware and real network testing. Vulnerabilities present in one environment may
not exist in another. It is always important to know how protocols will act under real scenarios.
Understanding the eects on real networks, allow administrators to focus on the true vulnerabilities
for their networks rather than theoretical aws that may have no eects.
As mentioned earlier, this analysis did not simulate attackers and the end of goal of this
study is to simulate both client and attacker nodes. The reason for not simulating the attackers was
due to an ongoing investigation of how to do this on hardware. It requires being able to modify the
BCR system parameters separately from the BS. The next three following chapters will present the
methods we applied on the ORBIT resources in an attempt to nd and manage the BCR system
parameters. The methods have been separated into three categories: Linux, Intel, and Protocols.
Each will be discussed in separate chapters.
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Chapter 4
Intel Centrino Advanced +
Wireless 6250
The hardware experiment investigation began with the ORBIT resources. The ORBIT BS
allowed us to set the BCR system parameters to whatever values we desired. Though we could
control the value of the parameters by modifying them on the BS, all SS's followed this one set of
values. We learned that simulating attackers that use a dierent set of BCR system parameters
than the BS set requires additional work. This work includes modify the parameters after the BS
sets them. The ORBIT nodes discussed in Section 2.4 use Intel R Centrino R Advanced + Wireless
6250 USB devices for WiMAX services. We rst analyzed the software provided with the device
that enables operation of the WiMAX hardware. We were looking to determine if the BCR system
parameters could be found and modied in the software.
The Intel devices include the following software on the nodes:
 Driver source code, wimax-1.5.1,
 Firmware, i2400m-fw-usb-1.5.sbcf, and
 Utility tools, wimax-tools-1.4.4.
The driver source code package has an open source license providing freedom to make
modications if needed to control the BCR system parameters in our case. The rmware is a
binary le that is not provided under an open license. The utility tools provide simple functions for
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checking the WiMAX services. It is the driver package that was investigated in our work. Each Intel
module will be discussed in detail in the Section 4.2. Following this, the techniques used to search
and modifying the module and source code in search of the BCR system parameters is presented
in Section 4.3. The two techniques include manipulation of the Intel source code and information
gathering from the debug congurable parameters for the Intel device. We hoped to nd the BCR
system parameters and/or verify the settings of these parameters through these two options. If we
could not control the system parameter by these means, at least being able to verify them on the SS
nodes would allow us to determine if other methods of modifying the parameters were successful.
Before delving into the two techniques in Section 4.3, we will rst provide an overview of the Intel
device and modules in the following Introduction section and Section 4.2.
4.1 Introduction
The driver source code package creates 3 loadable modules when compiled and installed into
a kernel. These modules can be divided into two parts, a WiMAX kernel stack and driver for Intel
i2400m. The driver is further modularized into a bus generic and bus specic driver. The following
WiMAX modules, i2400m, i2400m-usb, and wimax serve the following purposes respectively: bus
generic driver, bus specic driver, and WiMAX kernel stack [28]. These modules are dependent on
iwlagn module, a driver commonly installed in the Linux kernel for Wi-Fi applications.
One must make sure that drivers are loaded into the kernel before being able to use WiMAX.
Most system avoid wasting kernel memory by not keeping drivers in core when not in use and
support for automatic loading and unloading of modules [41]. A useful function for loading modules
is modprobe, a user-space helper function. It nds and loads other modules that the current
module is dependent on to function. For example running the following command will load not only
i2400m usb, but also i2400m and wimax :
modprobe i2400m usb
As a side note, one could congure /etc/moudles.conf for a particular module to automat-
ically set module options upon loading, executing commands before and/or after loading, assigning
an alias name, etc. For example, the alias could be set to wmx and/or debug levels of i2400m could
be set to high when loading modules. The following section will discuss debug level of each module
further and the purpose of each driver. The last two sections in this chapter examine two techniques
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used for nding the BCR system parameters and information related to them. Both techniques are
dependent on the WiMAX drivers and source code.
4.2 Driver Modules
The module i2400m forms the driver core and this part of the driver can additionally be
divided into two parts, OS-glue and hardware-glue [28]. The OS part interfaces with the Linux
operating system. The hardware part interfaces with the device according to the bus-specic driver.
This type of modularity allows easy adaption of hardware module for various operating systems.
There are multiple debug parameters for this module. The debug level is user congurable
with 0 being the lowest and 8 being the highest level. We created an image for the ORBIT testbed
that had all debug levels set high. While trying to understand how and where the system parameters
are handled, it was useful to have as much information as possible. The higher the debug levels
are the more information about WiMAX's operation is logged. The following debug parameters are
included with the i2400m module:
 dl tx, transmit,
 dl rx, receive,
 dl rfkill,
 dl netdev, network device,
 dl fw, rmware,
 dl debugfs, le system,
 dl driver, the actual driver, and
 dl control, the MAC management control.
These can be found within the Linux le system at:
/sys/kernel/debug/wimax:wmx0/i2400m
They can be read using the cat command and set by executing:
echo [0-8] > /sys/kernel/debug/wimax:wmx0/i2400m/[debug lename]
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Debug information is logged to two separate log les. One is specically for WiMAX, while
the other is a kernel log and contains information about various kernel operations as they execute.
The two log les with directory path included are:
 /var/log/wimax/system log
 /var/kern.log
This module also stores transmit and receive statistics. There are six statistics kept for each
receive and transmit. They include total packets, minimum packets in the received/transmit buer,
maximum packets in the received/transmit packet, total received/transmit buers, accumulated
receive/transmit buer size, minimum receive/transmit size (bytes), and maximum receive/transmit
size (bytes). These statistics can be viewed by reading the following le:
/sys/kernel/debug/wimax:wmx0/i2400m [rx/tx ] stats
The i2400m module has two additional debug congurable parameters. These are reset and
trace msg from user. All can be set by writing to the le associated with the parameter name. The
variable reset will perform a device reset. A warm, cold, and bus reset are possible by writing 0, 1,
or 2 relatively. Parameter trace msg from user creates a trace of messages originating in user space
to the trace pipe that i2400m module creates.
Congurable operational parameters for this module can be found at:
/sys/module/i2400m/parameters
These parameters include rx reorder disabled, passive mode, power save disabled, and
idle mode disabled. These parameters are dened in the IEEE 802.16e standard. The option
rx reorder disabled if set, would no longer allow the driver to reorder receive packets that are received
out of order resulting in an increase of corrupted data. With passive mode enabled, the driver will
no longer be responsible for device setup. Instead, setup must be done via user space and caution
must be taken to properly setup device. The power save mode allows a mobile SS to negotiate
periods of absence from the BS to save power. At these periods, the SS is unable to communicate
via the uplink or downlink channel. Lastly, idle mode allows a mobile SS with no data to transmit to
shutdown all active communications and only periodically become available for downlink trac [35].
This state can be requested by either the SS or the BS. The default conguration disables all of the
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parameters and this can be veried by making sure a '0' is wrote to each parameter le. To enable
these, one must write a 1 to the le by issuing the following commands on the node:
echo 1 > /sys/module/i2400m/[parameter name]
We have been interested with the last two operational parameters power save disabled and
idle mode disabled for reason that will be explained in Section 7.3.
An important feature of the universal serial bus (USB) is that it is just a communication
channel between a device and the host. It does not require standardized meaning or structure in
the data to function [41]. The i2400m-usb module denes and handles this communication. It also
has it own debug parameters that specically look at the USB communication interface. These
parameters included:
 dl tx,
 dl rx,
 dl notify,
 dl fw, and
 dl usb.
The i2400m-usb debug parameters can be found at that the following location:
/sys/kernel/debug/wimax:wmx0/i2400m-usb
The WiMAX stack provides common WiMAX control for current and future devices. The
kernels handling of network device is protocol independent [41] and therefore requires a module that
is common. This is a generic layer that provides uniform API to control dierent WiMAX devices
including a user space management stack. The stack works by embedding a struct wimax dev in
the machine's control structures and uses the generic netlink to send API calls to userspace [29].
The netlink commands are basic and include sending operation messages to and from kernel to user
space, killing and reseting operations, reporting a status change, and requesting current state. This
module, similar to i2400 and i2400m, has various debug parameters. These included:
 wimax dl stack,
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 wimax dl op rfkill,
 wimax dl op reset, and
 wimax op msg.
These can be found at the following location:
/sys/kernel/debug/wimax:wmx0
Both debug parameters for i2400m-usb and wimax can be read and set in the same fashion
as indicated for i2400m parameters. The only dierence is the path directory.
4.3 Methods
Two methods for investigating the BCR system used the Intel R Centrino R Advanced +
Wireless 6250 software. The rst technique looked at and modied the source code.The second
relied on setting the debug levels and analyzing the log les to see if the system parameters could
be found.
4.3.1 Wimax-1.5.1
The wimax-1.5.1 package is a hierarchy of les written in C-language. They include source
and header les. These le comprise the necessary code for integrating the WiMAX hardware and
rmware of the Intel device with the Linux machine. Some of the hierarchy along with important
directories, for our work, is depicted in Figure 4.1. We searched these les looking for parameter
variables that may include the BCR system parameters.
Understanding how the Linux kernel handles network devices is useful when attempting
to reverse engineer the source code. First, initialization of net devices is completed by dening a
structure known as the net device sturct [35]. This struct contains numerous parameters some of
which are visible and some that are not. Rmem start, rmem end, mem start, mem end, some of
the parameters within the net device, represent the beginning and end memory addresses of shared
memory used by the device. If receive and transmit use dierent memory addresses, rmem is for
receive and mem is for transmit. Other interesting parameters that could be signicant for security
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Figure 4.1: Directory hierarchy of Intel's wimax-1.5.1 source code
related work include tx queue length (max number of frames that can queued on the device transmit
queue), broadcast[] and dev addr[] hardware device address (MAC address).
There are also fundamental functions for operation of network devices such as open, stop,
set mac address, hard start xmit, etc. The last function, hard start xmit, initiates transmission of
a packet that is contained in a socket buer [35]. Interaction between network drivers and the
kernel occur one network packet at a time. A socket is a Unix abstraction to represent a network
connection. Input/output buers of any socket are a list of sk bu structures. This buer structure
host network data throughput. Interrupts are used to handle receiving data. Other fundamental
functions work in coordination with the function to build proper headers for transmitting packets.
When analyzing the source code, exhaustive searches were run on all les for keywords and
parts of words such as parameters, params, sk bu, UCD, ULMAP, etc. The source les containing
these words are returned by the search. The variables and functions that were returned by these
searches were further investigated in the context of the source code to see if they possibly could
contain the BCR system parameters or information related to them. Some the parameters found
that were promising and their associated les are listed in Table 4.1. The last column of this table
indicates what these structures and/or functions dene and handle according to the source code.
When there was a lack of or ambiguous information in the source code about suspected
variables and/or functions, another method was used to gain more insight. Source les were modied
to log parameters of interest using a function dened in the source code itself. The function used is
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Table 4.1: Source code parameters investigated for BCR system parameters
PARAMETER SOURCE FILE INFORMATION CONTAINED
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/DmGroupsHeaders.h,
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs Desc.h,
SF AND QOS FLOW MNGMT Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs.c Harq and non-harq, UIUC (1-10 modulation and coding)
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs Desc.h,
AggregatedBWRInfo, Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L2DmMonitorGroups.h,
IncrementalBWRInfo Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs.c r2, numberOfBWRs
Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB Common.c,
subscriptionParams t Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB if.h subscriber informatin and eap info
home nsps, capl, rapl, name, server ID, channel plan, polling
nwParams t Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMAX/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB.c interval, polling attempts, contention retries
nw Params t   > channel plan Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMAX/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB common.c bw, duplex mode, ftt, channel size
Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Wrappers/NDnS/wmxSDK Nds Internals.h,
wmx ConnectParams Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Wrappers/NDnS/wmxSDK Nds 3.c nsp ID, connection type, home NSP, user credentials
trac priority, sf ID, max sustained trac rate, max trac
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/DmGroupsHeaders.h, burst, tolerated jitter, max latency, UG interval, min
qosParams Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs.c resevered trac rate, cid, sf scheduling type
Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Agents/NDnS/Source/NDnSAgent L4P.c,
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4Common.h,
ChannelInfoArray (channel plan) Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4Structs.c preamble, frequency, bw, channel id, t
pointer to OMA Paramerters: manufacture, model , fwVer,
pWimaxParams Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Agents/NDnS/Source/NDnSAgent Monitor.c: hwVer, mac
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/DmGroupsHeaders.h,
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L2DmMonitorGroups.h, channel quality indicators: MIMOReportFlag, CQI
CQIParams Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs.c measurements
MSChapParams Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Wrappers/NDnS/wmxSDK Nds 3.c nsp ID, password, username
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L3L4DmStructs.c,
DcdUcdTimeout Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs Desc.h ms in frame
Infrastack/OSDependanet/Linux/L4Generated/L1DmMonitorGroups.h,
NormalULMap Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs Desc.h CRC Error, HCS errors
IdleParameter*,
PreInitConguration,
PLIParameters*, Infrastack/OSAgnostic/Product/AppSrvInfra/DeviceConguration.c Arq, harq, packet formatting information
Open mobile alliance device management parametrs: radio
Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs Desc.h, module, terminal equipment, mac address, manufacture, hw
OMA WimaxParams Infrastack/OSDependent/Linux/L4Generated/L4BufMan L3L4DmStructs.c version, operator name, fw version,
linkLossParams Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMax/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB Save.c stored nsp and network parameters for reconnecting
48
osallog(char* ch, int ush). The denition of this function is:
void osallog(char *ch, int flush)
{
static FILE *log = 0;
if (log == 0) {
log = fopen(OSALTRACE_FILE, "at");
if (!log)
log = fopen(OSALTRACE_FILE, "wt");
if (!log) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "wimaxd[osal] - can not open logfile (%s) for writing.\n",
OSALTRACE_FILE);
// release the lock if get any errors
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_mutex);
return; // bail out if we can't log
}
}
// write into file
fprintf(log, ch);
// put extra to log next line to build
//fprintf(log,"\n");
if (flush == 1)
fflush(log);
#ifdef OSAL_CONSOLE
printf(ch);
#endif
// release the lock once done with log
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_mutex);
// fclose(log);
}
This function was called where the parameters were accessed in the source code. For exam-
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ple, the following code:
char tmpBuffer[100];
sprintf(tmpBuffer, "nwParams_t Address: %d\nnwParams polling interval=%d, polling
attempt=%d\nsubscriptionParams Address: %d", nwParams_t, (*nwParams_t).pollingInterval,
(*nwParams_t).pollingAttempt, subscriptionParams);
osallog(tmpBuffer, 1);
was added to the le:
Infrastack/OSAgnostic/WiMAX/Agents/NDnS/L4 db/NDnSAgent DB.c
after nwParams was dened. After modiying the source code, the software package had to be
reinstalled on the Linux node for the change to take eect. To reinstall the WiMAX software the
following commands must be entered in the order listed below:
1. cd wimax-1.5.1
2. ./congure {prex=/usr {with-linux=/usr {with-libwimaxll=/usr {sysconfdir=/etc -localstatedir=/var
{enable-instrument
3. make
4. make install
After the source code was modied, the value of polling attempt and polling interval, both
dened in nwParams, and the memory addresses of nwParams and subscriptionParams are printed
to the log le when called in source code. The logging of these parameters can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Varying the BCR system parameters and comparing the log les for dierent parameters settings,
indicated no change in the nwParams variable. Since there was a change in the BCR system param-
eters but no change in the variable under investigation, we were able to determine that the system
parameters were not stored within the variable. This method of comparison was used repetitively
for dierent methods and is described in more detail in the following Subsection 4.3.2.
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Figure 4.2: Log le from modied source code
4.3.2 Debug
Figure 4.3 shows the process that was used to wean information about the system parameters
from the log information. First, the system parameters, backo start and backo end, had to be set.
The default parameters were always used to begin, backo start set to 3 and backo end set to 15.
Next, nodes were congured and, specically, the debug levels were veried and set on the nodes.
The debug image that was created could be used and loaded onto the nodes. But when interested
in what information a specic debug level would give, one needs to set only this debug level. When
nodes and debug levels are congured, the nodes are connected to the WiMAX network, trac is
passed and received, and then the nodes are disconnected from the network. After this the system
parameters are modied one at a time and the process is restarted. At least two nodes are used
so that trac can be passed. Stepping through this process allows the log les to log information
during all WiMAX processes that would be executed during an experiment: connection, passing
trac, and disconnection.
For each cycle a separate log les is saved so that comparisons can be made. To keep log les
from becoming full of other information while setting up for the next run and to separate between
each cycle. The tail command issued on the log les was used to write logged information to a
separate le. An example of this command is:
tail f [log lename] >> [new lename]
At least two runs and the corresponding log les, each with dierent system parameter
values, were used to do comparisons. The log les contain a variety of information including the
data packets sent to device from user space and received from the BS. We were looking for packets
in the log that had bytes change along with the change in the system parameters. In this way, we
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Figure 4.3: Flow chart of process used to nd BCR system parameters
were attempting to nd the UCD message and the system parameters setting set by the BS in this
MAC management message. Specically, data packets of the same size were analyzed to see if at
least one or two bytes vary indicating the system parameter change. The network conguration used
in our experimentation was always the same allowing us to assume that the UCD message size at
the various stages of connection would be constant throughout experiments.
Changing the system parameters in a controlled fashion aids in the ability to use this
technique for nding them. For example, rst changing only one system parameter, backo start,
by a value of one and keeping backo end the same allows us to look for one small change in the
logged data. Typically, we would then set backo start back to default and decrease backo end.
This method was used throughout our entire investigation for the BCR system parameters.
There was an overwhelming amount of information logged when the following debug levels
were set to a maximum value for all modules:
 dl rx,
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 dl tx,
 dl control,
 dl driver,
 dl usb, and
 dl fw.
With use of the i2400m.h header le located in the following directory /include/linux/wimax,
we were able to isolate logged information from the time the rst successful connection command
was sent until the disconnect command was sent. Within this time interval, investigation of packets
labeled rx cntl were compared and two potential packets were found that may carry the BCR system
parameters. Further investigation is required to condently determine that these logged messages
store the system parameters.
Setting a minimum number of debug parameters will make future analysis easier. We
determined that the important debug values for potentially gaining information about the system
parameters backo start and backo end include dl rx and dl control. The other debug parameters
set for our logs provided no insight to the parameters. Additionally, the use of both dl rx and
dl control provided redundant information about the the received packets.
4.4 Summary
Intel R Centrino R Advanced + Wireless 6250 USB device is reviewed in this Chapter. Pre-
sented in two sections are the techniques we used to gain information about how the WiMAX device
and Linux drivers provided for the device handle the BCR system parameters. The debug param-
eters, Section4.3.2, and the wimax-1.5.1 source code, Section 4.3.1 provide abundant information
about how this WiMAX device works. Though we have reason to believe the system parameters can
be veried via the log les. Soon we will see in Chapter 6, are study suggests that the BCR system
parameters of interest are managed by the rmware only. It appears they are only passed to the SS
node as information packets for debug logs and not MAC control messages. This result continued
our search for a means to modify the BCR system parameters which leads us to Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Linux
After searching the source of the Intel R Centrino R Advanced + Wireless 6250 USB devices
and not nding a variable or function that directly handled the BCR system parameters, we next
looked to the Linux systems running on the SS nodes. The Linux system interacts and manages
the peripheral devices that are installed on the SS nodes. For this reasons, we hypothesized that
the BCR system parameters may be passed by the WiMAX device to the Linux operating system
and stored there. Though are search of the source code did not uncover the system parameters, it
was plausible that a communication function had been overlooked that passed the parameters to
the Linux system. With this in mind, we dug into the Linux le system and memory in hopes of
discovering the BCR system parameters.
The ORBIT nodes run Linux kernel 2.6.35. Linux is a free, open-source operating system
that is written and built in C programming language. Open-source software gives users the luxury
of seeing how the system is implemented and the freedom to change the code if needed or desired.
When granted root-access to a Linux kernel, such as researchers are on ORBIT nodes, one can change
and modify the operating system in any way. The open-source platform and root privileges allowed
exibility in the techniques we applied to investigate the BCR system parameters on Linux. This
freedom was needed because the WiMAX protocol does not allow you to override the BS mandated
system parameters. If the BCR system parameters were found, unauthorized modications would
have to be made to them. Modication would allow attackers to have a dierent setting than the
client SS's that continue to appropriately follow the BS's settings.
As seen in Chapter 4, we were able to modify the open-source drivers developed for Linux
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systems. In this Section we look at two more methods used to locate the BCR system parameters
and understand how they are handled and accessed. The rst, leverages the information stored
within the Linux le system, Section 5.1. Special emphasis was given to the /proc directory and is
explained in Subsection 5.1.1. The second method, uses GDB, a common Linux debugging tool, to
hunt for the parameters within the memory of the Linux node, Section 5.2.
5.1 File System
On a UNIX or Linux system, everything is a le; if something is not a le, it is a process [15].
This statement is true but can be misleading if ones denition of a le does not include unordinary
les such as directories, special les, links, sockets, and named pipes. After drivers, le systems are
the most important class of modules in a Linux system [41]. The typical Linux les system structure
can be seen in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Linux le system hierarchy
The /proc le system is created by software and used by the kernel to export information to
the world. Each le relates to a kernel function that generates le contents in /proc. Many command
line functions simple read /proc les. For example, the command lsmod gets the information from
/proc/modules and displays it in a user-friendly format. Device drivers export information via
/proc [41]. Clearly the le system is read from, but it can also be written too. Most /proc les are
intended to be read-only but forced memory overwriting can provide a means around this. If the
BCR system parameters were found in the /proc directory, we could use this technique to overwrite
them and set them to whatever parameter settings we choose.
Drivers and modules get classied into classes in Linux. Three common classes include char
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devices (accessed as stream of bytes similar to le), block devices (sends data in randomly accessible
xed size data blocks similar to a disk), and network interfaces. The last type encompasses devices
that can exchange data with other hosts [41]. Unfortunately, network interfaces do not easily map
to le system such as char and block devices. Instead of having input and output assigned to a le
within the /dev directory, they are assigned unique names. The name for WiMAX device is wmx.
Information gets stored as les under the interface name.
Within the Linux le system is various WiMAX related les. Some are conguration les,
other log les, but we are attempt to nd out if the system parameters of BCR are stored somewhere
within the le system. The Linux le system is displayed as a tree in Figure 5.2. The promising
parent directories include:
 /proc - interface to kernel data structures,
 /var - system writes to les within during operation,
 /sys - exports kernel device information to user space,
 /usr - secondary hierarchy for user data, and
 /etc - conguration les for Linux system.
Each of these directories stores information related to WiMAX and network devices. Chap-
ter 4 looked at the log les contained within the /var directory and the WiMAX congurable
operational parameters that are stored in /sys directory. Also in the /var directory are WiMAX
database and denitions les and /etc directory contains a WiMAX conguration le. The le
name and path directories are:
 /var/lib/wimax/WiMAX DB.bin,
 /var/lib/wimax/ WiMAX Def.bin, and
 /etc/wimax/cong.xml.
The backo start and backo end system parameters were not found in any of these WiMAX
les. The /usr directory contains WiMAX security information such as keys and certicates, but
again, does not contain the system parameters leaving only the /proc directory, which the next
section will look at in great detail.
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Figure 5.2: Linux directory path of WiMAX related les
5.1.1 Proc
As mentioned earlier, the /proc directory contains an abundant amount of information
about the Linux operating system. It contains information about registered resources with
/proc/ioports and /proc/iomem [41]. Memory assignments are saved within the /proc direc-
tory, and each running process has its own directory there. Another useful and important part of
information that is stored here is the kernel symbol table.
At load time, any unresolved symbols used in a module are linked to the kernel symbol table.
The addresses of global kernel items such as functions and variables are stored in this table. This
allows drivers to be implemented in a modularized fashion. For example, the three Intel WiMAX
drivers are modularized and stacked on top of each other. The i2400m is dependent on i2400m-
usb and wimax. We see the symbols again in the memory dumps that look for the BCR system
parameters in the next section.
Scripts were used to write the contents of les from this directory to a text le that was
later compared for dierent system parameter conguration. We were looking for a specic le
that changed to reect system parameter changes. The thought was that controlling the system
parameters could be accomplished by overwriting this specic le. Entries within the /proc directory
included:
 /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/wmx0/[lename]
 /proc/sys/net/ipv4/[lename]
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 proc/i2400m usb*
 proc/i2400m-rx*
 proc/i2400m-tx*
 proc/iwalgn*
The les with the '*' at the end are process identication numbers (PIDs). These numbers
change each time that the WiMAX service is started. The bash script uses grep to search the
output of the command ps aux, which returns process information, to nd the iwlagn and i2400m
processes. The text output from the script can be seen in Figure 5.3. There was no entry found
within /proc that corresponded to the system parameters backo start and backoend. The three
WiMAX related process were always found to be asleep and not active. It is possible that more
information is stored in these entries when the processes are active. A dierent script or code would
need to be developed to log the le entries within the process directories when the process becomes
active. Our script only logged the information when the the process were asleep.
Figure 5.3: Text output from script that logged /proc directory information
5.2 Memory
The memory of Linux operating systems can be separated into virtual and physical memory.
The virtual memory system allows for more addressing than physical memory would allow. Virtual
memory is the address space and physical memory is actually present on the machine. Kernel and
user space work with virtual addresses that are mapped to physical memory [2]. Page tables dene
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the exact memory mapping. Additionally, every peripheral device is controlled by writing and read-
ing to and from the devices registers. A device typically has several registers and they are accessed
at consecutive addresses in the memory or the I/O address space [41]. The memory address space
of the Intel WiMAX modules can be determined in a couple of ways. The command lsmod gives
the size of the modules and /sys/module/[module name]/sections stores the memory oset.
Both pieces of information can be found by reading the contents of /proc/modules, Figure 5.4.
Given the total size and the memory oset it possible to dump the memory of the address space
with proper software tools.
Figure 5.4: Contents of /proc/modules with WiMAX module information
GDB, the GNU project debugger, is a powerful interactive debugger used typically to trace
a programs execution and execute one line at a time [15]. Beyond simple execution, GDB can be
used to accomplish more complex tasks, such as reversing the execution, examining stack memory
and symbols, and accessing memory of executing program. A feature of interest for our work is the
ability to load the running Kernel in GDB. This allows one to examine the virtual memory used by
the WiMAX drivers. The debugger is invoked as though the kernel were an application. All that
must be provided to GDB to accomplish this, is the le name of the uncompressed kernel image and
the core le [41]. An example of how to start GDB with the kernel as an application is:
gdb /usr/src/linux/vmlinux /proc/kcore
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The /proc/kcore le represents the kernel executable in the format of a core le; it is a
huge le that represents all kernel address space and all physical memory. GDB optimizes access
by caching the core le information. GDB should be restarted to keep the core le cache up-to-date
or it must be ushed. We used GDB to look at and write the memory of the Intel 6250 WiMAX
drivers to binary les. Each time we ran an experiment and dumped the memory looking for the
BCR system parameters, we restarted GDB. In this way the cache was update with each experiment
run.
Linux loads the Intel 6250 drivers as three separate modules: wimax, i2400m, andi2400m-
usb. Each time the system is restarted and/or modules are installed, they are loaded into a dierent
part of memory. Though the start and end addresses dier, the memory structure and layout for
each module remains similar, Figure 5.5. Each module is loaded into memory based on dependence,
for example i2400m usb is dependent on i2400m, therefore i2400m is loaded rst into memory and
assigned a lower memory address.
Figure 5.5: Example of memory stack of WiMAX modules
Memory dumps were made while the nodes were connected to the WiMAX network and
passing trac. The le comparison command cmp, which allows for binary comparison, was used
to determine if the memory dumps for diernet BCR system parameter conguration showed any
dierences. Again, the les compared were the same indicating that the system parameters were
not stored with the memory assigned to the WiMAX modules.
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5.3 Summary
The Linux le system and memory was explained in this chapter. The various WiMAX les
in the Linux le system that were dissected in search of the BCR system parameters are discussed.
Also conveyed are the details of how we searched both the /proc directory and the Linux kernel
memory for the BCR system parameters, backo start and backo end. Besides the log les discussed
in Chapter 4, no information about the system parameters was found within the Linux le system
or memory. This conclusion provides us no means to control the system parameters in hardware
and again suggests that the system parameters may never leave the rmware on the WiMAX device.
These results are not entirely unexpected because the IEEE 802.16e standard requires all SS to
follow the BS's settings of the system parameters. Since one is not suppose to deviate from these
settings, there is no direct, easy way to set the system parameters independently on the nodes and
nding a way to do so in hardware is onerous task. Next, Chapter 6 will describe one last technique
that we have exercised in hopes of nding a means to modify the system parameters.
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Chapter 6
Reversing Protocols
This chapter presents one additional technique we used for collecting information about
the BCR system parameters; trac captures. Early on this method was applied to the WiMAX
interface on the Linux nodes in ORBIT to hopefully capture the control and management messages,
including the two MAC management messages of interest, the UCD and UL-MAP messages. There
was some surprise to the lack of trac captured on this interface, which led to further investigation
of the Intel device, Chapter 4, and the Linux network stack, Chapter 5. The trac seen suggest
that only the rmware handles the BCR system parameters.
The captures at this interface are further discussed in Section 6.2. After fully considering the
methods presented in the previous Chapters 4 and 5, we began to consider the possibility of man-
in-the-middle attacks to manipulate the BCR system parameters. Following conversations with the
ORBIT administrators, we determined that there was a wired interface between the BS and ASN-
GW that would allow for man-in-the-middle attacks with support from the ORBIT administrators.
The trac captures and analysis of this interface is presented in Section 6.3. Before taking a more
in-depth look at these trac captures, Section 6.1 will provide more details of the resources use for
trac captures and the motivation.
6.1 Introduction
Network trac captures can provide a myriad of information about how network protocols
work including management and security, as well as end-user information, such as content being
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communicated and devices. This technique of sning trac is used by many types: malicious
users to steal and monitor user information, developers to debug communications, and educators
to teach people about communication protocols. There is many tools to complete trac captures;
tcpdump, Wireshark, and Tshark are just a few. All use the pcap application programming interface
to manage trac captures which in Linux systems is known as the libpcap library. Tshark [12] is a
command-line interface tool that is oered in addition to Wireshark [13]. Due to the command-line
interface of the ORBIT nodes, Tshark is used to complete network trac captures.
Our desire to complete network trac captures on the ORBIT testbeds was rst initiated
by a wanting to better understand how WiMAX management messages are handled on Linux nodes.
It later turned into an investigation of whether or not man-in-the-middle attacks could be used
to control the BCR system parameters. For these reasons trac captures were completed on two
dierent interfaces within the WiMAX network. The following two sections detail the captures of
these two interfaces and the information that was gleaned.
6.2 Ethernet
WiMAX trac was captured at the wmx0 interface on the Linux nodes. The wmx0
interface is the network device interface assigned to the WiMAX hardware. After turning on the
WiMAX radios on the nodes and conguring the IP addresses for these interfaces, the trac captures
began. Trac was collected while the nodes connected to the WiMAX BS, each node pinged all
other nodes on the network and was pinged by other nodes, and then when it disconnected from
the BS. These steps are depicted in the ow chart in Figure 6.1. During all of this of time, the only
packets that were collected at the wmx0 interface were the ping requests and replies on the network.
On the outdoor testbed there was also miscellaneous broadcast messages and ARP requests from
other devices on the network.
Figure 6.2 shows the details of a Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping reply that
was carried over the WiMAX network. All WiMAX protocol headers have been stripped before
receiving the packet at the wmx0 interface. For this reason we do not see the BS identication
number (BSID) anywhere in the packet, 44:51:DB:00:00:00. Four protocols are encapsulated at this
interface: Ethernet, IP, ICMP, and the payload. The MAC addresses for the source and destination
in the Ethernet header are identical and belong to the WiMAX interface, MAC address of the Intel
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Figure 6.1: Flow chart of trac capturing process on the wmx0 interface
6250 WiMAX device. After the Ethernet header, is the IP header which contains the IP address
of node 1 and node 2, 10.41.14.1 and 10.41.14.2 respectively. The ICMP and payload information
follows the IP header.
Figure 6.2: Ping reply captured on the wmx0 interface
64
The limited packets seen at the wmx0 interface indicates that none of the WiMAX MAC
management messages are transferred to the Linux network device structure. Information about
these messages may be encapsulated and sent via other communication to the kernel log. Due to
the lack of control and management messages available on the nodes, we decided to look for another
interface point. A point that was wired allowing for the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack.
6.3 R6+ Protocol
One Ethernet connection in the ORBIT WiMAX network is between the Access Service
Network Gateway (ASN-GW) and the BS. This provides one wired connection within the wireless
network that could be used for a possible man-in-the-middle attack. The Access Service Network
(ASN) and the ASN-GW handle and manage a plethora of important WiMAX management func-
tions. The ASN is dened as a complete set of network functions needed to provide radio access
to a WiMAX subscriber [9]. The ASN can include multiple network elements, one or more BS and
ASN-GW [6]. Some of the required functions of the ASN are WiMAX Layer-2 (L2) connectivity with
WiMAX mobile stations, transfer of authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) messages,
authorization and session accounting for subscriber sessions, network discovery and selection of the
WiMAX subscribers preferred network service provider (NSP), relay functionality for establishing
Layer-3 (L3) connectivity with a WiMAX mobile station including IP address allocation, and Radio
Resource Management (RRM). The ASN-GW is the logical entity that performs the control-plane
functions including the RRM, radio resource and Quality of Service (QoS) management at user
authentication.
Radio Resource Management refers to measurement, exchange, and control of radio resource-
related indicators in a wireless network. This refers to the techniques and communication used to
measure, estimate, and set radio resources. The RRM would be used to implement proprietary
algorithms for radio resource allocation [9]. RRM is not always required because BS can implement
many of the services initially, though it is required for handovers to support mobile stations. RRM
messages are sent over what are referred to as reference points. Each reference point communicates
between two varying end points. The reference point 6, R6, consists of the set of control and Bearer
Plane protocols for communication between the BS and the ASN-GW. The Control Plane includes
protocols for data path establishment, modication, and release control in accordance with the
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mobile station events. The NEC BS uses a proprietary R6 protocol referred to as R6+.
An R6 protocol message of interest is the RRM Spare Capacity Report. This message in-
cludes the RRM BS Info which contains the Full UCD Setting [10]. Table 2.1 and 2.2 in Section 2.1.3
provides more detail about these messages. The RRM Spare Capacity Report is sent by the BS to
ASN-GW to indicate its available radio resources [11]. We hypothesized that when conguring the
BCR system parameters for the BS, they may get stored on the ASN-GW and passed between the
ASN-GW and the BS. If this was true, it would allow for a possible man-in-the-middle attack to
modify the packets that passed the BCR system parameters.
Through collaboration with the ORBIT management team we captured trac on the Eth-
ernet link between the ASN-GW and BS. Originally we followed the capturing process indicated in
Figure 6.1. After review of this trac, we were not able to nd the system parameters backo start
and backo end. With further thought, we captured the trac again using the process depicted in
Figure 6.3 in case these system parameters were passed between the ASN-GW and BS directly after
a user set them. A small number of the packets captured between the ASN-GW and BS can be seen
in Figure 6.4. After comparing the packets captured for various congurations of backo start and
backo end we determined that they are not passed between the ASN-GW and BS.
Another R6 protocol message that was investigated was the Path Reg Req and Path Reg Rsp.
These messages are used to request and establish the R6 data path between the ASN-GW and BS.
The details of Path Reg Rsp can be seen in Figure 6.5. Similar to the ping reply seen in Section 6.2,
the rst information seen in the packet is the Ethernet destination and source MAC addresses fol-
lowed by the IP address information. Following the IP information is the WiMAX ASN control
path information. There is a variety of information TLV encoded in this part of the packet. We see
the BSID near the beginning of this part of the packet. The TLV encodings do not follow the R6
standard due to the proprietary R6+ protocol being used.
6.4 Summary
Network trac captures are common tool for reverse engineering communication protocols
and gathering information. In this chapter, the trac captured at two very diverse WiMAX related
interfaces are discussed. These two interfaces are the wmx0 interface, acts as the network device
interface for the Linux OS, and the Ethernet interface between the WiMAX BS and ASN-GW.
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Figure 6.3: Flow chart of trac capturing process on the R6+ interface between the ASN-GW and
BS
Figure 6.4: Trac capture on the R6+ interface between the ASN-GW and BS
The protocol used on the latter interface connection is a proprietary protocol, R6+, that dierenti-
ates from the standard control protocol, R6, for management communication between the BS and
ASN-GW. Two packets, a ping reply and PATH REG RSP, are parsed and the various protocol
encapsulation is revealed. Unfortunately, we were not able to capture MAC management messages
at the wmx0 interface providing more evidence that these control and management messages along
with the BCR system parameters are handled and isolated in the rmware on the WiMAX devices.
Additionally, the few R6 protocol messages that may have contained the system parameters were
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Figure 6.5: Path Reg Rsp message details
not discovered in the R6+ protocol used in this test environment. The following chapter will draw
conclusion about this study and present the current status of this work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary
Wireless technologies are now a common part of everyday communications. From past
wireless protocols and wireless security research, we are aware that there are numerous security
aws apparent in wireless protocols and many of these aws enable DoS attacks on the protocol.
One novice DoS attack is presented in this study. Additionally, network and wireless security research
is often conducted via software simulations and the results are applied to actual real-life, hardware
networks without further investigation. Many times hardware experimentation does not produce
the same results as software. We have found that stringent network and wireless security research
usually requires two things: reverse engineering and hardware experimentation.
Our proposed DoS attack manipulates the Bandwidth Contention Resolution system param-
eters of the IEEE 802.16e protocol. Our study of this attack has resulted in reverse engineering the
WiMAX protocol implemented in hardware and analysis of hardware WiMAX environments. This
paper documents this process and can be used as a starting point for conducting similar investigation
of wireless and network protocols. Also, details of the IEEE 802.16e standard and protocol, previous
WiMAX security research, and NS-2 software simulations of the BCR system parameters aects on
throughput and packet-loss are presented and discussed in this document. The initial purpose of this
study was to replicate the NS-2 software simulations. Hardware experiments that manipulate the
BCR system parameters has proven to be more challenging than the software simulations. Despite
the obstacles we have faced in attempting hardware experiments, a myriad of informative informa-
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tion related to WiMAX, Linux, and dierent wireless network environments have been discovered
through this study.
Chapter 3 analyzed the indoor and outdoor WiMAX testbed environments of ORBIT. The
results of this analysis suggest the importance of software simulations and hardware experimentation
in network security testing. The indoor environment supports ideal conditions such as many software
simulations do. Our study suggests there can be dramatic dierences in the results of studies carried
out in this environment compared to actual outdoor wireless networks. Chapter 4 and 5 present
a variety of congurable and managed parameters that could be used in future WiMAX security
research.
Finally, Chapter 6 looked at a WiMAX control protocol not commonly known, R6 protocol,
and the WiMAX interface of the Linux operating system. This last chapter highlighted a dierent
aspect of wireless networks that many of us do not consider and, in doing so, raised awareness
of another piece of the network that is potentially vulnerable to attack. It also provided a better
understanding as to how the Linux's network interface for WiMAX interacts with the actual WiMAX
device. Though we hoped otherwise, the Linux WiMAX interface is basically an Ethernet interface.
It does not handle any of the WiMAX layer messages.
Despite that we were unable to carry out our original goal of manipulating the BCR system
parameters, this investigation has served to be very benecial, and will hopefully provide guidance
and aid to other conducting WiMAX and other network protocol hardware experiments . Unfortu-
nately we are unable to draw rm conclusions about the BCR system parameters settings. Software
simulations suggest that the client SS's settings of the parameters is critical for decreasing vulner-
ability to BCR system parameter DoS attack. Section 2.3.3 recommends setting levels for some of
the system parameters to provide robustness to this type of DoS attack. The hardware experiments
suggest that these settings may not be as critical in real networks. Without replicating attackers in
our hardware experiments, we can not conclude for sure that this statement is true. Before bring-
ing the document to a close, we will look at other work related to this study in Section 7.2 and,
nally, work still needed to be completed for this investigation and possibly work that this study
has discovered in Section 7.3.
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7.2 NetKarma
It is always a pleasure to have ones work inspire work by others. The work presented in this
study has already served to promote and further other research. A project initially began to capture
and aid GENI research collaborated with us during our study because of our GENI experiments.
NetKarma is a project of Indiana Universitys Data to Insight Center. The purpose is to capture
and visualize provenance of GENI experiments.
The ns-2 software simulations from [7] was one of the rst GENI related experiments
visualized using this tool. We collaborated with the researchers at Indiana University to aid in
this eort by helping them to understand the ns-2 simulations and data and what were the most
important measurements. NetKarma captures not only provenance of packet movement, but also
infers critical provenance regarding packets that were dropped, and by doing so is able to convey
information about DDoS attacks through visualization that was done earlier through ANOVA [38].
This was accomplished by using an NS-2 extension that generates an XML and trace le. The two
les are input to NetKarma and Cytoscape [5] is used to visualize this data.
Figure 7.1 [3] visualizes the packet-loss for a specic parameter conguration that varies
bw request retry. Each line that is seen in the visualization connects from the BS, at the origin,
out to either a client or attacker node. Attacker nodes are the red lines and client nodes are
yellow. Each row of gures represents a dierent value of bw request retry. The left most column
represents the nodes that experience packet loss in red. Int the middle column, the size of the nodes
is proportionate to the number of packets dropped. So the red nodes seen in the left column have
the largest radius in the middle column. On the other hand, the right most column the size of the
nodes are proportionate to the number of packets transmitted and successfully received.Table 7.1
summarize the parameter conguration for this visualization. The results of the visualization agree
with the conclusions drawn by Deng [7]. The number of packets dropped signicantly decreases
when bw request retry is increased from 2 to 6.
Table 7.1: Experiment runs from ns-2 simulations used by NetKarma for Figure 7.1
Run ID Frame Duration # of Attackers/Clients Dos backo start Dos request retry Bw backo start Bw request retry
406 0.01 80/20 1 2 1 2
407 0.01 80/20 1 2 1 6
408 0.01 80/20 1 2 1 10
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Figure 7.1: NetKarma visualization of bw request retry from software simulations
7.3 Future Work
There is a variety of current and future work related to this study. We are still pursuing
some options for possibly controlling the BCR system parameters in ORBIT's WiMAX testbeds.
The rst option takes advantage of the indoor testbed and the UCD, UL-MAP interval. It would
involve setting the BCR system parameters twice and using the indoor testbed attenuators to fade
the path of specic nodes after the rst set of system parameters. This would ideally allow for one set
of nodes to use the rst set of parameters and a second set of nodes to use the second conguration
of system parameters. If possible, the fade on the rst set of nodes would be removed bringing all
nodes back to operating state on the network, and there would be a maximum of 10 seconds before
the next UCD message would reset all system parameters to the same setting. This small interval
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would allow for short experiments to be run. There are some logistics that currently have led us to
doubt the plausibility of this technique. The biggest concern is that ORBIT's BS must be reset to
take new BCR system parameter settings. Further investigation as to whether or not there is a way
to set them on-the-y is required.
The second option we may look at involves the BS to ASN-GW connection again. ORBIT,
as well as Clemson University, now has an Airspan BS installed. The Airspan uses the standard R6
protocol for communication between the BS and ASN-GW. This opens new possibilities for a man-
in-the-middle attack on this link. Also worth noting, is the manipulation of BCR system parameters
can be accomplished on the physical layer if the right equipment was available. Packet construction
is simple enough and the needed equipment would include Digital RF generator and wave generator
at the appropriate frequencies. Unfortunately, this type of equipment was not available for this
study.
Additionally, this study has opened many avenues for new future work. Due to the reverse
engineering of WiMAX in Linux and the Intel R Centrino R Advanced + Wireless 6250 USB devices,
there is now a clear understanding of the parameters that are handled outside of the rmware and
by Linux operating system. Manipulation of these parameters would provide for interesting wireless
security experiments and research. For example, manipulation of the QoS parameters could likely
have negative eects on other SS on a network. Hopefully, this study will aid others in WiMAX
hardware research and serve as informative resource about IEEE 802.16e, WiMAX, and reverse
engineering network protocols.
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Appendix A MAC Layer Management Messages
MAC MANAGEMENT TYPE MESSAGE NAME DESCRIPTION CONNECTION
0 UCD Uplink Channel Descriptor Broadcast
1 DCD Downlink Channel Descriptor Broadcast
2 DL MAP Downlink Access Denition Broadcast
3 UL MAP Uplink Access Denition Broadcast
4 RNG REQ Ranging Request Broadcast
5 RNG RSP Ranging Response Basic/Initial Ranging
6 REG-REQ Registration Request Basic/Initial Ranging
7 REG-RSP Registration Response Primary
8 reserved Primary
9 PKM-REQ Privacy Key Management Request Primary
10 PKM-RSP Privacy Key Management Response Primary
11 DSA-REQ Dynamic Service Addition Request Primary
12 DSA-RSP Dynamic Service Addition Response Primary
13 DSA-ACK Dynamic Service Addition Acknowledge Primary
14 DSC-REQ Dynamic Service Change Request Primary
15 DSC-RSP Dynamic Service Change Response Primary
16 DSC-ACK Dynamic Service Change Acknowledge Primary
17 DSD-REQ Dynamic Service Deletion Request Primary
18 DSD-RSP Dynamic Service Deletion Response Primary
19 reserved Primary
20 reserved Primary
21 MCA-REQ Multicast Assignment Request Primary
22 MCA-RSP Multicast Assignment Response Primary
23 DBPC-REQ Downlink Burst Prole Change Request Basic
24 DBPC-RSP Downlink Burst Prole Change Response Basic
25 RES-CMD Reset Command Basic
26 SBC-REQ SS Basic Capability Request Basic
27 SBC-RSP SS Basic Capability Response Basic
28 CLK-CMP SS network Clock Comparison Broadcast
29 DREG-CMD De/Re-register Command Basic
30 DSX-RVE DSx Received Message Primary
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MAC MANAGEMENT TYPE MESSAGE NAME DESCRIPTION CONNECTION
31 TFTP-CPLT Conguration File TFTP Complete Message Primary
32 TFTP RSP Conguration File TFTP Complete Response Primary
33 ARQ-Feedback Standalone ARQ Feedback Basic
34 ARQ-Discard ARQ Discard message Basic
35 ARQ-Reset ARQ Reset message Basic
36 REP-REQ Channel measurement Report Request Basic
37 REP-RSP Channel measurement Report Response Basic
38 FPC Fast Power Control Broadcast
39 MSH-NCFG Mesh Network Conguration Broadcast
40 MSH-NENT Mesh Network Entry Basic
41 MSH-DSCH Mesh Distributes Schedule Broadcast
42 MSH CSCH Mesh Centralized Schedule Broadcast
43 MSH CSCF Mesh Centralized Schedule Conguration Broadcast
44 AAS FBCK REQ AAS Feedback Request Basic
45 AAS FBCK RSP AAS Reedback Response Basic
46 AAS Beam Select AAS Beam Select message Basic
47 AAS BEAM REQ AAS Beam Request message Basic
48 AAS BEAM RSP AAS Beam Response message Basic
49 DREG REQ SS De-registration Request message Basic
50 MOB SLP REQ Mobile Sleep Request Basic
51 MOB SLP RSP Mobile Sleep Response Basic
52 MOB TRF IND Mobile Trac Indication Broadcast
53 MOB NBR ADV Mobile Neighbor Advertisement Broadcast/Primary
54 MOB SCN REQ Mobile Scanning intevbal allocation Request Basic
55 MOB SCN RSP Mobile Scanning intevbal allocation Response Basic
56 MOB BSHO REQ BS Handover Request Basic
57 MOB MSHO REQ MS Handover Request Basic
58 MOB BSHO RSP BS Handover Response Basic
59 MOB HO IND Handover Indication Basic
60 MOB SCN REP Mobile Scanning result Report Primary
61 MOB PAG ADV BS broadcast Paging Broadcast
62 MBS MAP MBS Map Multibroadcast
63 PMC REQ Power control Mode Change Request Basic
64 PMC RSP Power control Mode Change Response Basic
65 PRC-LT-CTRL Set-up/tear-down of Long-Term MIMO precoding Basic
66 MOB ASC-REP Association result Report Primary
67-255 Reserved
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Appendix B ORBIT Outdoor and Indoor Experiment Data
OUTDOOR
AVERAGE THROUGHPUT SYS. PARAMETER
RUN NODE 1-1 NODE 1-2 NODE 1-3 NODE 1-4 NODE 1-5 NODE 1-6 NODE 1-7 NODE 1-8 SINK BACKOFF S BACKOFF E
1 1655.46667 1766.4 2048 2048 2048 2048 1962.66667 1954.13333 15513.6 3 2
2 1817.6 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 1211.7333 2005.3333 15146.6667 1 10
3 2048 2030.9333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2030.9333 2048 16332.8 3 2
4 1877.3333 1979.73333 2048 2048 2048 2048 1783.46667 2048 15872 1 6
5 2056.3333 2056.3333 2056.3333 2048 2048 2039.46667 1902.93333 1928.53333 16102.4 1 10
6 2048 1996.8 2056.3333 2048 2048 2048 1459.2 2005.3333 15675.73 5 6
7 2039.46667 2005.3333 2056.3333 2048 2048 2048 1979.73333 1740.8 15948.8 5 2
8 2048 2048 2056.3333 2048 1681.06667 2048 2039.46667 1971.2 15914.67 1 6
9 2056.3333 2056.3333 2056.3333 2048 1638.4 2048 1911.46667 1954.1333 15744 3 10
10 2056.3333 2048 2048 2048 1996.8 2048 1945.6 1962.66667 16136.53 5 6
11 2022.4 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 1954.1333 2048 16264.53 3 2
12 2030.9333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 1979.73333 2048 16298.67 1 10
13 2030.9333 2030.933 2048 2048 2048 2048 1211.7333 2048 15496.53 5 10
14 2056.533 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2039.46667 1979.73333 1629.86667 15880.53 3 6
15 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16375.4667 5 10
16 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16375.4667 5 6
17 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 16375.4667 3 10
18 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 2048 16366.9333 1 2
19 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 5 2
20 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 1 6
21 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16375.4667 5 10
22 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 16384 5 2
23 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 2039.46667 16384 1 2
24 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16401.0667 3 6
25 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 3 10
26 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2039.46667 2048 2048 16375.4667 3 6
AVG: 2020.08 2034.86 2051.57 2048 2016.16 2047.02 1919.67 1997.78 16111.3
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OUTDOOR
PACKET LOSS SYS. PARAMETER
RUN NODE 1-1 NODE 1-2 NODE 1-3 NODE 1-4 NODE 1-5 NODE 1-6 NODE 1-7 NODE 1-8 SINK BACKOFF S BACKOFF E
1 401.066667 290.133333 0 0 0 85.3333333 93.8666667 878.933333 3 2
2 238.933333 8.53333333 8.53333333 0 0 0 836.266667 42.6666667 1126.4 1 10
3 8.53333333 25.6 0 0 0 0 17.0666667 0 59.7333333 3 2
4 179.2 76.8 8.53333333 0 0 0 264.533333 0 529.066667 1 6
5 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 0 8.53333333 145.066667 119.466667 281.6 1 10
6 8.53333333 59.7333333 0 0 0 0 588.8 42.6666667 708.266667 5 6
7 17.0666667 51.2 0 8.53333333 0 0 68.2666667 307.2 452.266667 5 2
8 8.53333333 8.53333333 0 8.53333333 366.933333 0 8.53333333 76.8 477.866667 1 6
9 0 0 0 0 409.6 0 136.533333 93.8666667 640 3 10
10 0 8.53333333 0 8.53333333 51.2 0 102.4 85.3333333 264.533333 5 6
11 34.1333333 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 93.8666667 0 136.533333 3 2
12 25.6 8.53333333 8.53333333 0 0 0 68.2666667 0 110.933333 1 10
13 25.6 25.6 8.53333333 0 0 0 836.266667 0 896 5 10
14 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 8.53333333 68.2666667 418.133333 503.466667 3 6
15 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 5 10
16 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 5 6
17 0 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 8.53333333 17.0666667 3 10
18 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 8.53333333 0 17.0666667 1 2
19 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 5 2
20 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 1 6
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 5 10
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 5 2
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.0666667 8.53333333 25.6 1 2
24 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 3 6
25 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 3 10
26 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 8.53333333 3 6
AVG: 67.6571 40.2286 4.59487 2.4381 59.1238 1.21905 237.105 91.4286 504.686
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INDOOR
AVERAGE THROUGHPUT SYS. PARAMETER
RUN NODE 1-1 NODE 1-2 NODE 1-3 NODE 1-4 NODE 1-5 NODE 1-6 NODE 1-7 NODE 1-8 SINK BACKOFF S BACKOFF E
1 2013.86667 2013.86667 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 16088.9492 3 2
2 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 1 10
3 2013.86667 2005.3333 2013.86667 2005.3333 2013.86667 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 16106.3051 3 2
4 1996.8 2005.3333 1988.26667 1996.8 1996.8 1988.26667 1971.2 1971.2 15958.7797 1 6
5 2005.3333 1988.26667 1979.73333 1988.26667 1988.26667 1988.26667 1971.2 1971.2 15941.4237 1 10
6 2013.86667 2005.3333 2005.3333 1996.8 2013.86667 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 16088.9492 5 6
7 2056.53333 2056.53333 2048 2048 2039.46667 2048 2048 2048 16653.0169 1 6
8 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 2039.46667 2039.46667 16401.3556 5 2
9 2065.06667 2065.06667 2056.3333 2056.3333 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 16375.322 3 10
10 2005.3333 1988.26667 1996.8 1996.8 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 1996.8 16036.8814 5 6
11 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 2005.3333 1996.8 1996.8 1996.8 1996.8 16054.2374 3 2
12 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 16097.6271 1 10
13 2005.3333 2013.8667 2013.8667 2005.3333 2013.8667 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 16114.9831 5 10
14 2013.867 2013.8667 2005.3333 2013.8667 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 2005.3333 16132.339 3 6
15 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 5 10
16 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16401.0667 5 6
17 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2039.46667 2048 2048 2048 16375.4667 3 10
18 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 1 2
19 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 5 2
20 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16401.0667 1 6
21 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 5 10
22 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2039.46667 2048 2048 16375.4667 5 2
23 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16392.5333 1 2
24 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 3 6
25 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 3 10
26 2056.5333 2056.5333 2056.5333 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 16384 3 6
AVG: 2038.15 2035.86 2031.91 2030.6 2030.61 2028.96 2026.99 2026.67 16271.8
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INDOOR
PACKET LOSS SYS. PARAMETER
RUN NODE 1-1 NODE 1-2 NODE 1-3 NODE 1-4 NODE 1-5 NODE 1-6 NODE 1-7 NODE 1-8 SINK BACKOFF S BACKOFF E
1 72.81778 34.1333333 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 341.333333 3 2
2 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 1 10
3 34.1333333 42.6666667 34.1333333 42.6666667 34.1333333 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 332.8 3 2
4 51.2 42.6666667 59.7333333 51.2 51.2 59.7333333 76.8 76.8 469.333333 1 6
5 42.6666667 59.7333333 68.2666667 59.7333333 59.7333333 59.7333333 76.8 76.8 503.466667 1 10
6 34.1333333 42.6666667 42.6666667 51.2 34.1333333 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 349.866667 5 6
7 0 0 8.53333333 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 17.0666667 1 6
8 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 8.53333333 221.866667 5 2
9 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 17.0666667 17.0666667 17.0666667 25.6 93.8666667 3 10
10 42.6666667 59.7333333 51.2 51.2 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 51.2 401.066667 5 6
11 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 42.6666667 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.2 392.533333 3 2
12 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 341.333333 1 10
13 42.6666667 34.1333333 34.1333333 42.6666667 34.1333333 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 315.733333 5 10
14 34.1333333 34.1333333 42.6666667 34.1333333 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 42.6666667 315.733333 3 6
15 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 5 10
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6
17 0 0 0 8.53333333 8.53333333 0 0 0 17.0666667 3 10
18 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 1 2
19 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 5 2
20 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 1 6
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10
22 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 17.0666667 5 2
23 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 1 2
24 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 3 6
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
26 0 0 0 8.53333333 0 0 0 0 8.53333333 3 6
AVG: 16.9135 17.3949 21.0051 18.7077 18.0513 19.6923 21.6615 21.9897 161.477
80
Appendix C Cirriculum Vitae
KATHERINE CAMERON
Phone: 503-516-0492
Email: kccamer@clemson.edu
15 Riggs Hall, Clemson University
Clemson, SC 29634
Expertise: Network and computer security, intelligent systems, communications, and embedded
systems
ACADEMIC
M.S. Electrical Engineering May 2013
Clemson University, Clemson, SC GPA: 3.73/4.00
B.S. Electrical Engineering May 2008
University of Portland, Portland, OR GPA: 3.52/4.00
CAREER HISTORY
Clemson University, ECE Department Clemson, SC 08/11 Present
Research Assistant
 Conducting research under Dr. Richard R. Brooks in computer and network security.
 Projects include WiMAX vulnerability to DDoS attacks and deception as computer security
counter measure.
 Conducted research independently, analyzed data, and documented and published the research
methods and results.
Bonneville Power Administration Salem, OR/ Vancouver, WA 07/08 08/11
Field Communications Engineer
 Second in command for assurance and maintenance of communication system for our district and
management responsibilities when supervisor was absent.
 Installed and integrated telemetry and communication equipment for new Waste Management
generation site, designed and implemented digital communication system to complete Phase II
SONET ring and construct un-collapsed bre ring, upgraded communication systems from DS1
to DS3 capacity for video conferencing purposes.
 Managed craftsman and contractors, applied troubleshooting skills to electronic equipment under
urgent deadlines, updated district documentation resulting in work eciency.
Telecom Design Engineering Aid 05/07 07/08
 Communication site design and development.
81
 Evaluated new sites and designed tower, antenna, and battery systems for SONET ring construc-
tion, analyzed microwave paths for radio hops of SONET ring, oversaw turn-up and testing of
radios and multiplex equipment for SONET ring.
 Documented designs, ordered materials, and coordination with other disciplines and contractors.
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
EAGER-GENI Network Security and Trac Analysis Clemson, SC 08/11 Present
Clemson University, Dr. Richard R. Brooks
 Investigation of the eect of IEEE 802.16e protocol Bandwidth Contention Resolution system
parameters on vulnerability to Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
 Applied factorial experiment design and ANOVA analysis.
 Simulation of experiments on remote hardware and presentation of work at multiple conferences.
Deception Countermeasures for Software Attacks Clemson, SC 08/12 01/13
Clemson University, Dr. Richard R. Brooks, and Sentar
 Developed, modeled, and analyzed innovative countermeasures to attacks on critical software.
Import controlled project.
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
 R. R. Brooks, "Introduction to Computer and Network Security: Navigating Shades of Gray",
CRC Press, Boca Raton, FLA, (2013)
 ACM Conference on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence: Publication, Cost-Eective
Quality Assurance of Wireless Network Security (October 2012)
 GENI Engineering Conference 14: Poster presentation, Status Quo: WiMAX Parameters and
MAC-Level DoS Attacks Boston, MA (July 2012).
 N2 Womens Workshop: Poster presentation, Eects of WiMAX Parameters on MAC-Level DoS
Attacks, Orlando, FL (March 2012).
 GENI Research and Experimenter Education, GREE 12: Publication, WiMAX: Bandwidth Con-
tention Resolution, Vulnerability to Denial of Service Attacks (March 2012)
 GENI Engineering Conference 13: Poster presentation, Eects of WiMAX Parameters on MAC-
Level DoS Attacks Los Angles, CA (March 2012)
82
Bibliography
[1] Derrick D Boom. Denial of service vulnerabilities ieee 802.16 wireless networks. Technical
report, DTIC Document, 2004.
[2] Andries Brouwer. The linux kernel, 2003.
[3] Peng Chen. Role of provenance in visualizing packet throughput and packet loss. 07/2012 2012.
[4] P. Chi and C. Lei. A prevention approach to scrambling attacks in wimax networks. In In
World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks & Workshop, pages 1{8, 06/2009 2009.
[5] Cytoscape Consortium. Cytoscape. http://www.cytoscape.org/, 2013.
[6] NEC Corporation. Nec access service network. http://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/
nsp/WiMAX/products/access.html, 2009.
[7] Juan Deng, Richard R Brooks, and James Martin. Assessing the eect of wimax system pa-
rameter settings on mac-level local dos vulnerability. International Journal of Performability
Engineering, 8(2):183, 2012.
[8] WiMAX Forum. Mobile wimax - part 1: Technical overview and performance evaluation.
08/2006 2006.
[9] WiMAX Forum. Wimax forum network architecture. stage 2: Architecture tenets, reference
model and reference points part 1 release 1.0 version 4. wmf-t32-002-r010v04. 02/2009 2009.
[10] WiMAX Forum. Wimax forum network architecture: Detailed protocols and procedures base
specication. wmf-t33-001-r015v02. 11/2010 2010.
[11] WiMAX Forum. Wimax forum network architecture stage 3: Detailed protocols and procedures.
wmf-t33-001-r010v05. 02/2010 2010.
[12] WIreshark Foundation. Tshark. http://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html,
2011.
[13] WIreshark Foundation. Wireshark. http://www.wireshark.org/, 2011.
[14] Lee Garber. Denial-of-service attacks rip the internet. IEEE Computer, 33(4):12{17, 2000.
[15] Machtelt Garrels. Introduction to Linux. Fultus Publishing, 2010.
[16] IEEE 802.16 Working Group et al. Ieee 802.16{2004 ieee standard for local and metropolitan
area networks part 16: Air interface for xed and mobile broadband wireless access systems.
standards. ieee. org/getieee802/download/802.16 e-2004. pdf, 2004.
83
[17] IEEE 802.16 Working Group et al. Ieee 802.16 e{2005 ieee standard for local and metropolitan
area networks part 16: Air interface for xed broadband wireless access systems amendment for
physical and medium access control layers for combined xed and mobile operation in licensed
bands. standards. ieee. org/getieee802/download/802.16 e-2005. pdf, 2005.
[18] J Han, Mohamad Yuso Alias, and Goi Bok Min. Potential denial of service attacks in ieee802.
16e-2005 networks. In Communications and Information Technology, 2009. ISCIT 2009. 9th
International Symposium on, pages 1207{1212. IEEE, 2009.
[19] J. Hong, M. Alias, and B. Goi. Simulating denial of service attack using wimax experimental
setup. International Journal of Network and Mobile Technologies, 2-1:30{34, 01/2011 2011.
[20] Junbeom Hur, Hyeongseop Shim, Pyung Kim, Hyunsoo Yoon, and Nah-Oak Song. Security
considerations for handover schemes in mobile wimax networks. In Wireless Communications
and Networking Conference, 2008. WCNC 2008. IEEE, pages 2531{2536. IEEE, 2008.
[21] Aleya Hussain, John Heidemann, and Christos Papadopoulos. A framework for classifying
denial of service attacks. In Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies,
architectures, and protocols for computer communications, pages 99{110. ACM, 2003.
[22] Information Sciences Institute. The newtork simulator. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/, 2011.
[23] ITU-T International Telecommunication Union. X.690 series x: Data networks and open sys-
tem communications, osi networking and system aspects- abstract syntax notation one (asn.1).
07/2002 2002.
[24] Internet2. Internet2. http://www.internet2.edu/, 2012.
[25] Houda Labiod, A Hossam, and Costantino De Santis. Wi-, bluetooth, zigbee and wimax.
2007.
[26] Pero Latkoski, Zoran Hadzi-Velkov, and Borislav Popovski. Modeling and optimization of
bandwidth request procedure in ieee 802.16 networks. In Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio
Communications (PIMRC), 2010 IEEE 21st International Symposium on, pages 1469{1474.
IEEE, 2010.
[27] Felix Lau, Stuart H Rubin, Michael H Smith, and Ljiljana Trajkovic. Distributed denial of
service attacks. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 2000 IEEE International Conference on,
volume 3, pages 2275{2280. IEEE, 2000.
[28] 2008 Intel Corporation <linux wimax@intel.com>. Driver for the intel wireless wimax connection
2400m. 2008.
[29] 2008 Intel Corporation <linux wimax@intel.com>. Linux kernel wimax stack. 2008.
[30] Douglas C Montgomery. Design and analysis of experiments. Wiley, 1991.
[31] Sheraz Naseer, Muhammad Younus, and Attiq Ahmed. Vulnerabilities exposing ieee 802.16 e
networks to dos attacks: A survey. In Software Engineering, Articial Intelligence, Networking,
and Parallel/Distributed Computing, 2008. SNPD'08. Ninth ACIS International Conference on,
pages 344{349. IEEE, 2008.
[32] Qiang Ni, Alexey Vinel, Yang Xiao, Andrey Turlikov, and Tao Jiang. Wireless broadband access:
Wimax and beyond-investigation of bandwidth request mechanisms under point-to-multipoint
mode of wimax networks. Communications Magazine, IEEE, 45(5):132{138, 2007.
[33] NICTA. Omf unlock your experiments. http://www.mytestbed.net/, 2012.
84
[34] NLR. The network for advanced research and innovation. http://www.nlr.net/, 2005.
[35] Lout Nuaymi. WiMAX: technology for broadband wireless access. Wiley, 2007.
[36] Sanida Omerovic. Wimax overview. Faculty of Electrical Engineering, University of Ljubljana,
Slovenia, 2006.
[37] Konstantinos Pelechrinis, Marios Iliofotou, and Srikanth V Krishnamurthy. Denial of service
attacks in wireless networks: The case of jammers. Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE,
13(2):245{257, 2011.
[38] Beth Plale, Peng Chen, Devarshi Ghoshal, and Yuan Luo. Visualization of network data prove-
nance. 11/2012 2012.
[39] Ramjee Prasad and Fernando J Velez. WiMAX Networks: Techno-Economic Vision and Chal-
lenges. Springer, 2010.
[40] Dipankar Raychaudhuri, Ivan Seskar, Maximilian Ott, Sachin Ganu, Kishore Ramachandran,
Haris Kremo, Robert Siracusa, Hang Liu, and Manpreet Singh. Overview of the orbit radio
grid testbed for evaluation of next-generation wireless network protocols. In Wireless Commu-
nications and Networking Conference, 2005 IEEE, volume 3, pages 1664{1669. IEEE, 2005.
[41] Alessandro Rubini and Jonathan Corbet. Linux device drivers. O'reilly, 2001.
[42] Andrew Rutherford. Introducing ANOVA and ANCOVA: a GLM approach. Sage Publications
Limited, 2001.
[43] Alexander Sayenko, Olli Alanen, and Timo Hamalainen. Scheduling solution for the ieee 802.16
base station. Computer Networks, 52(1):96{115, 2008.
[44] Jolyon White, Guillaume Jourjon, Thierry Rakotoarivelo, and Max Ott. Measurement archi-
tectures for network experiments with disconnected mobile nodes. In Proc. of TridentCom,
volume 46, pages 350{365, 2010.
[45] Rutgers University's WINLAB. Orbit lab. http://www.orbit-lab.org/, 2011.
85
